

13.

A  
Third LETTER

To the Reverend  
Dr. *SHERLOCK*,

BEING  
An *Answer* to his *Considerations* offered to the Bishop  
of *BANGOR*.

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*All these— for Reasons best known to your self, you have dealt with, as the Priest and Levite in the Gospel did with the wounded Samaritan, that is, only lookt upon them, and pass'd by. But now at least when you are admonished of it— I wou'd entreat you to take them into your Consideration, and to make some shew of saying something to them, lest otherwise the World should interpret your obstinate Silence, a plain Confession that you can say nothing. Chillingworth's Conclusion.*

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With an APPENDIX, in Vindication  
of a Passage in the Former Letter against  
Dr. *SNAP E*.

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By *ARTHUR ASHLET SYKES*, M. A.  
Rector of Dry-Drayton, near Cambridge.

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
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*Account 4<sup>th</sup> p. 27.*

THE LETTER

To the Reader

OF THE







A T H I R D  
LETTER

To the Reverend  
Dr. *SHERLOCK*, &c.

*Reverend Sir,*



A M obliged a Third Time to give You and the World this Trouble, for the sake of that Truth which I once hoped from your great *Abilities* might have receiv'd considerable Light. I am sorry that I have so far incurr'd your Displeasure in this Dispute, as to give you Occasion to declare to the World that you *do not like such a Correspondent*, p. 76, as I am: But I am more concerned that my Lord Bishop of *Bangor* has no greater Credit with you, than not to be believed upon Assurances of *Fact*. I know not whence it arises, but it's become methinks almost fashionable amongst some  
B Men,

Men, who have us'd their weak Endeavours to blast his Lordship's Reputation, to call in Question any Fact which his Lordship asserts. Hitherto they have fail'd in their Attempts. Have you, Sir, a *Living Man* in *petto* ready to prove that his Lordship did *choose* me for his *Second*, p. 29, or *put me to this Employment*, p. 76? Otherwise 'tis hardly to be conceiv'd what should make you so *positive* in a *Fact* of this kind, since his Lordship had *assured* you *that he knew no more than your self till some time after it was published*, (P.S. p. 81.) of the *Letter* which drew you unwarily into this Controversy. I must therefore desire you to prove

I. That my Lord Bishop of *Bangor* *put me to the Employment* of writing against you.

But before I proceed to the Examination of your *Considerations*, or point out what I conceive to be faulty in that Book, I beg leave to remind you how artfully you have forsaken the Controversy betwixt us, and how fain you would engage his Lordship in an intricate Dispute about the *Laws* of *Nature*, of the *Magistrate*, and of *Christ*; and about their respective Obligations; whilst by That Means the Reader may forget what 'twas that engaged you in this Controversy. You were charged with holding the very same Tenets which you have been so ready to *censure* in the B. of *Bangor*. Several Passages were produced out of your *Sermon*; and the Passages cited from his Lordship's *Sermon* and condemned in your *Report*,  
were

were proved to be exactly the *same* with yours. Your Answer to this was examined, and the Shifts you made Use of were proved insufficient. Have you own'd this? Or have you acknowledg'd your Self mistaken on *either* Side? Not a word. The *Report* is defended, and the *Sermon* is defended: *i. e.* Both Sides of a Contradiction are defended as true at the same Time. And then Occasion is taken from a Passage, (which I readily own to have had too much Sarcasm in it,) to treat me with *Contempt*, to drop that Controversy in which you was engaged, and to begin another upon other Matters. I cannot help asserting this, till I see some other Defence of your Self than hitherto you have vouchsafed to make, and I must tell you, that you are still to prove, and 'tis *The Point* you are to make good; and 'tis expected that you should make good,

II. That the *Principles* contain'd in the Passages cited from your Sermon, are *different* from the *Principles* condemned by You in the *Report*.

Supposing therefore that I have been *unhappy*, as *unhappy* as you are willing to represent me, upon the Subject of the *Laws of Reason and Christ*, p. 74. yet to single out some Passages upon *That Subject*, and to refute *Them*, is to recede from the Difficulties you were press'd with your Self, in order to divert the Reader from the *real Point* to one of another Nature.



Indeed p. 51—52, you seem uneasy in your Condition, and propose an Objection which would likely be started, if you should now give into his Lordship's, or rather acknowledge your *own*, Tenets. “ *Suppose, say you, that I had upon publishing your Lordship's Sermon professed my Self to be in your Sentiments, and had maintain'd that the Argument from the Spiritual Nature of Christ's Kingdom, or Christ's Ministers (which you please,) did entirely exclude the Magistrate from adding the Sanctions of this World to the Laws of Christ: Suppose Some-Body had sent me a Letter to shew my Inconsistency with my Self, and had proved it thus: You say, Mr. Dean, that the Argument drawn from the Spiritual Nature of Christ's Kingdom, excludes the Magistrate from adding Sanctions to the Laws of Christ: But how comes this Doctrine to please you Now, which displeased you in 1712?*” See your own Words. ‘ It ought always to be remembred, that Arguments from the Nature of Religion, and of Christ's Spiritual Kingdom against the Use of Temporal Punishments, are conclusive only as to the Ministers of that Kingdom, and cannot extend to the Civil Magistrate. ’ *The Argument was the same in 1712 as in 1717. The Views perhaps are altered.* This Objection you propose, and then say, *Tell me, my Lord, how I might answer this Charge; Tell me, I say, or else quit your own.*

Would



Would you give *me* Leave to answer this Case, I wou'd make no Scruple to say, *First*, This Objection might as justly have been made to you, by one of a *contrary* Opinion to his Lordship, had you declar'd your Self in *Favour* of his Lordship; as *now* I make it. And this must always be the Case of such as will maintain contrary Doctrines, whether their *Views* are altered or not. *2dly*. Till a Man *disowns* one of the contrary Doctrines, which he has maintained, he is fairly chargeable with *either* of them as Occasion serves. Nor is it more than *shuffling* to say, 'That he has maintain'd the contrary Doctrine, unless he *disowns* One Side, and thus professes his Opinion *explicitly* when he is called upon to do it. *3dly*. As the Conduct in maintaining Two contrary Doctrines at the same Time, has too near a Resemblance to *Equivocation*, and cannot be reconcil'd to Christian *Simplicity*; So a Readiness to hear and bear Conviction, and to give up what is proved to be false, has in it the Innocence of the Dove, whatever it wants of the Wisdom of the Serpent. You ought therefore, if you would avoid the Charge of *Double-dealing*, to renounce one of the two contrary Doctrines which you have taught. *Lastly*. You ought not to treat Men who hold *either* Side of the Question, with *Ill-nature* or *Contempt*, or to exercise Dominion over them, or censure them for Ill Designs: neither ought you to *rail at*, or *vilify*, much less to *prosecute* them: Since  
the

the Men of either Side of the Question have as good Reason to hold their respective Sides of it, as *You* have to hold *Both* Sides.

You'll be displeas'd, I don't much question, at my interposing in a Dispute which you would fain have with his Lordship, independent on the Controversy you were first engaged in. For you have told the World that you *Published* some of this Letter, *imploping his Lordship's Protection, and with no other Design in the World than to keep it out of my Hands*, p. 48. A *Finesse* I believe peculiar to, and *The Design* worthy the Dean of *Chichester*! To Publish with *no other Design in the World* than to keep it out of a particular Person's Hands, is something so unusual, that I dare say, You alone can explain it. But what is it you *implore his Lordship's Protection* for? Is it that you might engage upon those unequal Terms—*Ubi tu pulsas ego vapulo tantum*?—Hard indeed would be my Case, were I to be debarr'd the Sight of a Book wherein I am treated with such *uncommon Civilities*. But since his Lordship is painted as the *vilest Wretch*, and in one of the most *detestable* Characters in History, for giving you *good Words*; I may well be contented with any Usage, for not giving you *good enough*. I readily believe your own Excuse to be true in this Case too, and I accept it accordingly: 'Tis *Naturæ Vitium*, Men must write as they can, or else be silent. 'Tis your *Natural Temper and Disposition* so to treat his Lordship and Me too, as you have.

That

That the Reader may perceive the Grounds of this, I'll lay before him Some of the Passages in your *Considerations*. P. 29. Therefore your Friend the Letter-writer—has shewn that he is very capable of writing a Book upon a Subject he does not understand. Whether it was this Qualification that recommended him to your Lordship for a Second in this present Dispute, is more than I can affirm; but if it was, your Lordship has made a happy Choice. P. 65. Tho' I had as live teach Children to read, as answer his Letter, yet if you will put but a little of your Reputation upon this Issue, for your Lordship's sake I may be tempted to submit even to this Employment. P. 75. How happy are you, my Lord, in a Second! Again. P. 76. Nor can I imagine what tempted your Lordship to put him to this Employment, unless you chose a Second in the Humility of your Heart, as the Roman Consul did the Companion of his Triumphs.

———Sibi Consul

*Ne placeat, curru SERVUS portatur eodem.*

'Tis not enough to treat me in this Manner, but the Bishop is to be expos'd for my Infirmities. For my own part, I resolve no more to complain of or expose this Treatment from You, Sir, since 'tis *Natura Vitium*, than I would the Lameness of one born lame, or the Blindness of One who by *Natura Vitium* could never see.



I proceed therefore to the Merits of the Cause, in which I think my self concern'd, as well because you have concern'd your self with me in this Letter of yours to his Lordship, as because the Arguments used by me are the same, in effect, as those urged by his Lordship ; and likewise because a great Part of this will probably never come under his Lordship's Consideration in his *Reply* to the Convocation, which yet will deserve some Notice to be taken of it.

My Lord in the *P. S.*, which he did me the Honour to write, p. 82, takes Notice *in the First Place, of one very great Mistake in your representing his Sense upon a very important Subject. You lay it upon me, says his Lordship, That I write down the Magistrate's Power in ALL Cases, Ans. p. 30, and give it as my Sentiment that the World must be torn to pieces without Remedy ; and that the Magistrate is not to concern himself with the Practice, i. e. the outward Practice of Vertue, p. 24. because the same Action is a Law of Christ guarded by His Sanctions.*

How doth Mr. Dean answer This? First, *That ALL CASES is Five Lines afterwards limited to All possible Cases in Religion whatever. Confid. p. 12. Give me Leave to say, Sir, that this laudable, this safe, this artful way of writing, was the Occasion of this Controversy betwixt You and Me. The Magistrate's Power in ALL Cases, signifies with you, in ALL RELIGIOUS Cases, just as I observ'd*



observ'd in my Second Lett. p. 73. *ALL Methods of propagating Religion which are hurtful to Men*, is to be understood, *only* when such Methods are used *by the Church*: Temporal Punishments *are not* PROPER *to enforce the Laws of Christ*, i. e. not PROPER *in the Church*: Conscience in general, signifies an *Erroneous Conscience only*. You have thought it most to your Purpose to use these *General Expressions*, which when you are press'd with, you think it a sufficient Reply, to say you meant them *particularly*. 2dly. You tell us *Now*, that by *ALL Cases*, you mean, *ALL possible Cases in Religion whatever*. Will you stand by *This Exposition* of your Meaning, and not *again* limit these Words? If you will, I ask, whether his Lordship has either in his *Sermon* or in this *Postscript* wrote down the Magistrate's Power in relation to the Appointment of Time, or Place of Religious Worship? If you say, these are *not* concerned in any *possible Case of Religion whatever*, I shall only ask, *what Cases of Religion* can the Magistrate's Power reach to? If you say *These are concern'd*, I desire you to produce the Passage in the *Sermon* or the *Postscript* where his Lordship has wrote down the Magistrate's Power in *These Cases*. I am ready to grant you, that neither of these Cases here put, come under Cases of *Religion*, strictly so called: For That will take in no more than Things to be believed and practiced as enjoyned by Jesus Christ in order

to Salvation. But as you were speaking expressly of the *Exercise of Temporal Power* in Cases of Religion, Those Cases will be thought *possible* Cases of Religion. 3dly. His Lordship finds fault with you for charging him *with writing down the Magistrate's Power in ALL Cases*. To make him amends, you explain *All Cases*, by *All Cases in Religion*. We will suppose his Lordship had found fault with you for This: Why truly within two Lines more, you had got another Salvo ready. For as *all possible Cases of Religion whatever*, comprehend at least Things to be *believ'd* as well as *practis'd*, you throw out the *Credenda* of Religion, and say that his Lordship speaks of *enforcing the Laws of Christ in Matters of natural Morality*, *Ans.* p. 31. How gradual is this Descent? All Cases, *i. e.* All Cases possible of Religion, *i. e.* Matters of natural Morality. So that to write down the Magistrate's Power in *ALL Cases*, is only to write it down in *Matters of natural Morality*. How pleasant now is it to hear you saying, *Conf.* p. 13. *I beg, my Lord, that we may endeavour to understand one another in this Debate, and not make it necessary to trouble the World at every turn with an Explication of the most obvious and plain things?* As if his Lordship was to blame for charging you in your own Terms, and not your Self who had laid in such Store of Evasion.

Your next Attempt is to prove that the *Consequences charg'd upon his Lordship's Doctrines*,  
though

though not upon his Lordship, *really belong to it*, p. 14.

His Lordship said, that *to add temporal Sanctions to Religion, considered as Virtue and Charity under the Belief of a Supreme Governour and Judge, is to act contrary to the Interests of true Religion*. Upon this Principle you have charged this Consequence, *That the World must be torn to Pieces without Remedy*. Ans. p. 24. Conf. p. 15. My Lord in his P. S. denied this Consequence, and adds, *I have not us'd a single Expression tending that way*. p. 82. One would have expected here that you should have either produced such *Expression*, or have prov'd the *Consequence* which his Lordship denied. You propose indeed the Case, p. 14—15. But then you do, as you were pleas'd to say in another Case, *walk up to the Point, and for no Reason that I can see, but to shew your Bashfulness, and to run away from it*. You are therefore

III. To prove this Consequence: Because 'tis *contrary to the Interests of true Religion to add Temporal Sanctions to Religion considered as Virtue under the Belief of a Supreme Governor and Judge, THEREFORE the World must be torn to Pieces without Remedy*.

Your avowed Design was to consider whether *this Consequence belongs to his Lordship's Doctrine or not*, p. 14. After you have stated the Case p. 15, you begin to consider it in These Words: *How now does your Lordship*



*shew the great Mistake of this ? His Lordship does it, by saying it is the true and proper Business of the Magistrate to concern himself with the outward Practice of Virtue, and of every thing which affects the Happiness of Society. P. S. p. 83. and such a Power is sufficient to secure the Peace and Quiet of the World. As this is rational and clear, you have thought fit to give it another Turn, more proper for you, because unintelligible. You say, that his Lordship has shewn the great Mistake of that Consequence, by giving up all that He had been contending for, by shewing the World that Part of his Sermon was spent in condemning a Practise, which now it seems no Man can practise ; which 'tis absolutely impossible any one should. But, Sir, what is it his Lordship has been contending for ? Is it not This, That 'tis contrary to the Interests of true Religion to add temporal Sanctions to Religion considered as Virtue, &c. What is it now that he has given up ? Is it that Principle ? No ; For That his Lordship has not given up. Is it the Consequence which you charged him with, and his Lordship call'd a great Mistake ? No, nor that neither. Yet 'tis That which the Reader is to imagine is given up from the Method you have taken to express your self. You are therefore still*

IV. To prove that his Lordship has given up either the Principle he has been contending for ;  
Qr



Or, the *Consequence* which he call'd a *great Mistake*.

Your 16, 17, 18 Pages are spent in considering the Positions laid down in the *P. S.* from whence you infer his Lordship's *giving up* what he had been *contending for*. Your Lordship now teaches, say you, that *since the Laws of Christ require an outward Practice conducted by the inward Sincerity of Belief and the Motives of Religion, and the Magistrate cannot judge of the inward Sincerity and Motives; all he can do is to add Sanctions to the outward Practice, considered as affecting Society, let it be founded upon what Motive it will.*

To prove now that his Lordship by this Assertion has *given up* what he had *been contending for*, You object, First, *That 'tis altogether as reasonable to exhort Men not to Fly, as not to add Rewards and Punishments to the Laws of Christ, if it be as impossible to add Rewards and Punishments to the Laws of Christ as it is to Fly.* To this I reply,

First, The Sanction of a Law, is that particular Part of it which enjoins a certain Punishment to those who disobey the Law. In this Controversy we use it not only for Punishments, but likewise for the Rewards which the Law promises to those who obey it. Whosoever then has the Power to add Sanctions to a Law, must be strictly and properly the Legislator; For nothing else can be the *Sanction*,  
but

but what the Law it self appoints as the Reward or Punishment. In this Sense of the Word, 'tis strictly *True* that the Magistrate *cannot* add Sanctions to the Laws of Christ. But how doth the maintaining this give up the Other, that 'tis *contrary to the Interest of true Religion to annex temporal Rewards* to it? May not Money tempt Men to be Hypocrites, and the giving Money be *contrary to the Interests of Sincerity*, and yet a Man not have properly a Legislative Authority to add Sanctions to a Law? But *2dly*. Allowing it to be *impossible* to add Sanctions to the Laws of Christ, what if Men actually *pretend* to such a Power, in tho' they have it not? Nothing has been more common in the World than to exhort the Magistrate to make Use of *Force*, (usually in the soft Language of *moderate Penalties*) as the proper Instruments of Persuasion. You your self have taught us that Force is *proper* in the Hands of the *Magistrate* to make Men obey the *Laws* of Christ's Kingdom, though 'tis *improper* in the Hands of the *Church*. Upon this Principle it is, that *Inquisitions* have been set up in *Portugal* and *Italy*, and Persecutions have been carried on in all Parts of this *Western* World, to the great Scandal of the Christian Name. Now whilst the Powers of this World, are us'd in such Manner, and to such Purposes, and so many Thousands have been massacred under the *Pretence* of an Authority to add Sanctions to the Laws of Christ, is it ab-

furd

Re-furd or ridiculous to fet this Matter in a clear  
 the Light, and to fhew the Boundaries of a Civil  
 ate Power? No Acts are *religious*, but fuch as  
 ift. proceed from a Sense of pleasing God the bet-  
 up ter; fuch as are ferious, rational, and done  
 of from a fincere Belief of a Judgment to come.  
 it? Thofe Acts then of any Sort that have not  
 res, thefe Properties, thofe that are external, the  
 ate- Effects of Force, not of a willing Choice, can-  
 ro- not be Religious ones. Yet how customary is  
 ons it to *drive* Men into Practices and into Opini-  
 off- ons, called indeed *Religious* ones, and preten-  
 rift, ded for the Benefit of their Souls, which  
 ver, in reality make them rather *Odious* than *plea-*  
 ore *ing* to God, becaufe it forces them to an ex-  
 Ma-ternal Service and the Honour of the Lip,  
 the whilst their Hearts are far from Him? Whilst  
 the Men are every Day attempting this, and make  
 our their Fellow-Creatures miserable by fuch their  
 the Attempts, under the fpecious Pretence of ad-  
 bey ding Sanctions to the Laws of Chrift; 'twas  
 'tis highly to the purpofe to tell the World how  
 pon *contrary it is to the Interests of true Religion to*  
 een *add Temporal Sanctions, i. e. Rewards and Pu-*  
 ions nishments to *Spiritual* Laws. Upon This  
 Vef- Foot, your Questions will receive an eafy  
 nrif- Answer;

this First. *To what Purpofe does your Lordship ar-*  
 fuch *gue from the Nature of Chrift's Kingdom, of*  
 een *his Rewards and Punishments, from his being*  
 ty to *fole Judge and fole King, againft the Ufe of*  
 e ab- *Temporal Rewards and Punishments.* 'Twas, I  
 furd would



would reply, to shew the Absurdity of using *Punishments* for Opinions in Matters of Conscience and Salvation ; and of giving Rewards for Professing a Belief of such or such humane Doctrines.

2dly. *Was all this to shew how unlawful it is to do a Thing which it seems no Body can do ?* It was to shew how unlawful it is to do what no body strictly can do, but Thousands in all Ages pretend to do, and ten thousand are always exhorting them to do. If I am oppress'd by any Man, and ruined by him, 'tis all one to me whether he really had or could have such Power, or only pretended to have it. And were such vexatious Proceedings common in the World, he would do a signal Service who should attempt the Proof that such Oppressors could not have the Authority they pretended to have.

Your Second Objection is in these Words. *Tho' Christ and the Magistrate should Both require Virtue and Charity in the same Words, and tho' the Magistrate should declare it to be his Intention to promote Obedience to the same Law, yet the same Law would not be One, but Two.* P. 17. *The Magistrate may put all the Laws of Christ into his Code, and yet be no Encourager of Religion ; for they cease to be Laws of Religion as soon as they come there.*

To this I reply, *First*, If Christ requir'd only an *Outward Practice* of Virtue and Charity, or would be pleas'd with an *Outward Conformity*  
to



to his Laws, as the Magistrate is satisfied with an *Outward Conformity* to His, then indeed the Objection you make to his Lordship's Notions would be more plausible. But since Christ requires and enjoins, and will accept of nothing else but outward Practice conducted by inward Sincerity : Nay, since he has declar'd that Outward Conformity alone is an Abomination to him; the *Difference* betwixt the Laws of Christ and of the Magistrate must be evident. The Passages in Scripture which condemn severely *external* Worship when separated from *Internal*, are frequent : Nor are Any more common than those which command the Service of the *Heart, Spirit and Truth*, and a *reasonable Service*. Are then Temporal Punishments proper to enforce the Laws and Edicts of Christ, and to affect the Heart as it ought to be affected to make it acceptable to God ? Or have they any Tendency farther then to make Men *outwardly* conform ? There is then this Difference, and 'tis a very *material* one, that tho' the Magistrate by his Laws should require the *same* Action that Christ doth, and in the same Words, yet, the Rule of Action requiring a *different* Obedience, the Law must properly be *different*. Suppose the Magistrate enacts as Christ has commanded, *Thou shalt do no murder*; Suppose also a Man is desirous to be Master of his Neighbour's Goods, which he cannot be without taking away his Life : This too he resolves upon, but he wants a favourable  
D                      Opportunity.

Opportunity. This Man observes the Magistrates Law by his *outward Conformity*; but yet he is a Breaker of the Law of Christ, who searches the Heart, and will render to every Man according to the Intentions of That.

2dly. To make your Consequence as ridiculous as you can, you put it thus: *The same Law would not be One, but Two: 'Tis Christ's Law in the Gospel, but if it gets into the Statute-Book, 'tis as much Mahomet's Law as Christ's.* What is it that you mean by the word *Same*? 'Twas a Law of the twelve Tables at Rome, That no Man should bear false Witness: 'Tis a Law of Christ's too, *Thou shalt not bear false Witness*, Were These Laws strictly and philosophically the *SAME* Laws, or only the *SAME* as to the Matter of them? Was the Law of the twelve Tables, 450 Years before Christ was born, the very numerical same Law with that which Christ established so many years afterwards in the Gospel? Is not this as mere Chicanry as is possible, thus to play with an ambiguous Word? But I see the Cause is to be maintained at any Rate, these are your own Words (p. 72.) and that the Controversy is to be maintained by appealing to the Passions, or even the Follies of Mankind.

3dly. You your self p. 32, observe that the Roman Governors Laws were not Laws of Christ considered under the Formality of Christ's Laws: that is, you own them the same with Christ's as to the Matter only. If any Law of Christ's was made a Law of the Roman

Roman Emperor's, it then became a *Civil, Social Law* ; it required then, as a Civil Law, but a Civil Obedience ; it demanded no more than an *Outward Conformity* to it, and consequently *was as much Mahomet's Law*, or any one's else, *as Christs*.

Your third Objection is ; If the Magistrate cannot add *Sanctions* to the Laws of Christ, then he *can neither encourage nor discourage Religion*. For if the *Nature of Religion be such*, as not to be within reach of temporal *Sanctions*, the Consequence is, that 'tis no more in the Magistrate's Power to hurt it, than 'tis to cherish it. p. 18.

But That Consequence is denied. For tho' the Magistrate *cannot* add *Sanctions* to Christ's Laws, yet he may *discourage* Religion. Or will you say that *Dioclesian*, or any other Heathen Persecutor, added *Sanctions* to the Laws of Christ, or did not *discourage* Religion ? Or has any Master of a Family, who encourages Fidelity and Honesty in his Servants by Rewards, the Power of adding *Sanctions* to the Laws of the Magistrate ?

The Confusion in all this Controversy has arose, I think, from these *Three Sources*. The One is, that the Term *Sanction* is us'd sometimes *strictly* for that Part of the Law which annexes Punishments (or Rewards) to the Obedience or Disobedience paid to the Law : At other Times, for all Encouragement and Discouragement annex'd to them by the *Legislator*



or any one else. In the First Sense 'tis evidently *impossible* for any one to add Sanctions to a Law, except the Legislator himself. In the other Sense, *i. e.* in a loose and figurative way of Expression, the Magistrate may add *Sanctions*, and so can any body else, to a Law of Christ; *i. e.* they can encourage it, or discourage it, as to the Outward Practice, in their several ways; which is *in reality* making it so far their own Law, whatever the Pretence may be.

The Second is the Ambiguity of the Word *Same*. In the dextrous Management of which, Mr *Dean* has sufficiently shewn his Skill; But of this I have spoken already, and shall say more.

The Third and chief arises from not duly considering the Different Obedience to be paid to Christ's Laws and the Magistrate's. Christ by his Laws enjoins not only outward Practice, but perfect Sincerity of the Heart join'd with it. The Magistrate never demands more than Outward Conformity to his Laws. Whatever the Magistrate add Sanctions to, let it be done in what Words you please, and let what will be the End proposed, yet he *can* in the Nature of things encourage or discourage by his Sanctions but Part of what Christ commands, because he cannot distinguish betwixt well-managed Hypocrisy and Sincerity. The Laws of Christ consist of some things to be believed, and others

to be practised by us in order to Salvation. Our Opinions are and necessarily must be govern'd by the Evidence which we are capable of getting: and 'tis equally possible to *force* a Man to believe what is really contrary to his inward Conviction, and to make him think of and believe what he never heard of. The Civil Magistrate therefore has no Right to prescribe what particular Opinions his Subjects shall believe in order to Salvation; Nor can he select particular Doctrines as Articles of Christian Communion, the Neglect of which he resolves to punish with Prisons, Racks, or Fires. For, Christ proposing Heaven as the Reward of such who believed such and such Doctrines, Heaven will be obtained only by the Conditions proposed, and not by other Conditions of *human* Invention. Christ alone had the Right to make the Terms of Salvation. We are to accept Salvation upon those Terms. The Magistrate therefore cannot make *other* Terms, without assuming a Power he was never entrusted with: and If he adds his own Sanctions, He can oblige at most but to *outward Conformity*, which to Christ may be even an Abomination. Nay should the Magistrate select Those and Those only as Articles of Communion which Christ has made the Articles of Salvation, yet the Magistrates Sanctions, *i. e.* Rewards or Punishments, could reach but to *Outward Profession*, not the Heart which God alone can search. But besides matters of *Faith*, Christ has com-  
manded

manded us *Practice*, and has enjoin'd us the Performance of *Virtue*, and a *Hearty* Detestation of Vice. What now is the Power of the Magistrate here? His Business is certainly to *command* what *shall* be done, not to Philosophize or *teach*: 'Tis not to make Men Honest upon *Principle*; for if That were his Business, he has not Powers sufficient for that purpose. He is to keep his Subjects from *hurting* each other, and to direct the Power of the Society for the publick Preservation. This End may be obtain'd without his being able to affect the Heart, or without his looking upon Practice as our Blessed Saviour does. When the Magistrate *prohibits* any Vice, he doth not command that you should *detest* that Vice *from your Heart*; He doth not enjoin you that you shou'd look upon that Crime as Christ has commanded you; but he commands you not to Steal, Murder, or Forge under such or such Penalties, and esteems them good Subjects of his who never break his Laws, tho' Christ at the last day may condemn them to everlasting Fire. Does the Magistrate ever concern himself with the *Temper* and *Disposition* of that Man who avoids what his Laws prohibit, and complies with what They command? Doth He enquire if his Subject be *Willing* or *Unwilling*, or do his Duty upon *Principle* of Love, or Fear, or only for Want of Opportunity of doing contrary to it? No. These are the Business of our Religious Judge at the



last Day, and manifestly *enough* discover the Difference, the Essential Difference, betwixt the Laws of Christ, and of the Civil Magistrate.

I perswade my self that even *You* will think me in the Right in *thus* stating the Case, because I have *your* Concurrence with me, P. 26, 27. *Nothing*, you tell us, *can be the Matter of a Civil Law, which the Civil Magistrate cannot judge of: The Civil Magistrate cannot judge of internal Motives and Dispositions, but by the means of External Actions: And therefore the Motions of the Heart, before they break out into Action, are exempted from his Jurisdiction. And farther, Outward Actions and their Circumstances, being the only Indications of the Inward, which the Magistrate has to judge by; as long as the Outward Actions are such as they ought to be, supposing the Intention right, he has no Concern to enquire whether the Intention be otherwise: And therefore if Men act AS IF they were Honest. He has no Reason to look any Farther.*

These Points being thus stated, let us see what 'tis his Lordship has taught. *First*, Christ's Laws require not *Outward Practice* alone, but *Outward Practice conducted by inward Sincerity of Belief and the Motives of Religion*, P. S. p. 85. *2dly*. The Civil Authority can reach to *Outward Practice alone*. *ibid*. *3dly*. The Civil Magistrate adds his Sanction to *Outward Practice as it affects Society*, *ibid*.

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The First of these Propositions, I think, you will not deny. The 2d. is the same with yours just now cited. *The Civil Magistrate cannot judge of internal Motives and Dispositions, but by means of external Actions; i. e. as you explain it, He has no Concern to enquire whether the Intention be otherwise than Right, if Men act AS IF they were Honest.* The 3d. is the same with yours, *As long as the Outward Actions are such as they ought to be, — if Men act as if they were Honest, He has NO REASON to look any farther.* You are therefore still to prove that his Lordship has *given up* the Principle he had been contending for, and

V. That when the Magistrate adds his Sanctions to his Law, which can reach only to *external* Actions, then he adds Sanctions to a Law of Christ.

VI. That a Law obliging only to *Outward* Conformity is the very *self-same* Law with one which binds not only to *Outward* Conformity, but to *inward* too.

VII. That the Magistrate cannot *discourage* Religion, unless he has a Power to add Sanctions *properly*, to the Laws of Christ.

VIII. That the Magistrate cannot *encourage* Religion, unless he has a Power to add his Sanctions to the Laws of Christ.

You next proceed, *p. 18, 19* to carp at an Expression of his Lordship's, who *calls an Action*

*a Law*, and pretend immediately a *Design* not to be accurate in *Language* on purpose to humour a Principle. His Lordship's Words are, *Because the same Action is a Law of Christ.* PS. p. 82. And, *This same good Action is not a Law of Christ or Edict of his Kingdom.* 84.

I grant you that a *Law* is *the Rule of Action*, and not *the Action it self*; and therefore the plain meaning of his Lordship is, Not that such or such *Action* is a *Law* or *Rule of Action*, but such *Action* is required or commanded by such or such *Law*. However if it be so great a *Crime*, and such vast *Designs* are carrying on, under Cover of that Expression, I ask, What *Designs* was *you* carrying on, when you used the very *same* Form that you here condemn in the Bishop? Shall I say, *'Twas not for nothing that you chose to speak in that manner?* Or will you give me leave to charge you with talking against *the Reason and Philosophy of Language*, by *your* using this Expression? Or is there a Fate attends you that you shall always be guilty your self of what you find Fault with in the Bishop? His Lordship has quoted the very Page where you used this Form of Expression, Ans. p. 24. *Will it be sufficient for the Magistrate to say, when he is call'd upon to punish Offences against Virtue and Charity; This is Religion, THESE are Laws of Christ.* What, Sir, doth *THESE* relate to in this Sentence? Is it not *Offences?* And are not *Offences*

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Actions?



Actions? If you will supply your own Sentence as you must, I shall only say in behalf of his Lordship's, Go and do thou likewise.

Upon this Inaccuracy of Expression, which you your self was guilty of, you triumph for a Page, and endeavour to shew that his Lordship *could not be accurate in his Language when he strove to make the same Law as enacted by Christ, and as encouraged by the Magistrate. Two different Laws: 'Twas time to leave the old way of calling a Law the Rule of Action; for that one Law should make two different Rules of Action, i. e. that it should be the same Rule, and not the same Rule, was too knotty a Point to be explain'd.* Upon this let me observe,

First you have made use of the Word, *encouraged*, here instead of, *enacted*, which is not for nothing I suppose. If it be *One Law*, and only *One* and the *Same*, to which the Magistrate annexes *his* Sanctions, and Christ *his*, then you ought to say plainly and properly, 'tis *the same Law* enacted by Christ and by the Magistrate. If the Magistrate annexes his Sanctions to a Law, it has all the Properties of a Law; 'tis then *enacted*, not *encouraged*. 2dly. You expose his Lordship for *making the same Law as enacted by Christ and as encouraged by the Magistrate, two different Laws.* 'Tis impossible, you grant, for one Law to make two different Rules of Action. From this Concession I thus argue. Those are different Laws that

that are different Rules of Action. All Laws of the Civil Magistrate require but *Outward Conformity*, Therefore all his Laws are different from those that require both *outward* and *inward* Conformity. The Magistrate annexes his Sanctions, *Hanging*, for instance, to *Murder*. If a Man abstains from the Act of Murder, but yet encourages in himself all *Wishes* and *Desires* to Murder his Neighbour, and only wants an Opportunity to execute it, he observes the Magistrates Law, and is not reputed guilty before him. He pays all the Obedience that is expected or required of him, and satisfies that Law to the full. But Christ too has annexed his Sanction to the Law of *Murder*, and expects Obedience to be paid to That. Does then such a Man observe the Law of Christ? No, 'tis evident he doth not, because Christ requires a quite different Obedience to be paid to his Laws. Is the Law then, *Do no Murder*, which is the *same* in both Cases as to the Matter, but which require a *different* Obedience, as different as *external* and *internal*, Is this Law in reality *Two* or but *One* Rule of Action? Is there any *Reason or Philosophy in Language*, either our own, or any other in the World, which forbids us to call *different* Things by *two* Names. Or if the same Sound signifies different Things, is the *Reason and Philosophy of Language* against distinguishing them? His Lordship has endeavoured to speak, and in reality did speak

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justly,

justly, when he distinguished between *two different Rules of Actions*, tho' they were the *same in Sound*. You for want of this have led your Reader into Labyrinths not to be extricated. 3dly. Whatever *Reason or Philosophy in Language* may be against his Lordship, I ask, if in all Languages yet known, the *Appearance* of Virtue be not commonly call'd, *Virtue*? Or if whenever we meet with the Term, *Virtue*, we must understand it strictly and philosophically. 'Tis the same in the Word, *Prayer*. Lifting the Hands and Eyes up to Heaven together with other proper Postures of Body, and using a peculiar Form of Words as to God, is call'd, *Prayer*, whether a Man really *prays* to God or not. Nay, our Saviour himself has call'd it so, *Matt. 6. 5*. That is, The Appearances go by the *Name* of the Realities, and are call'd by the same common Term, tho' they differ as much as is possible. There is just the same Difference betwixt the *Laws of Christ* and the *Magistrate*, in respect to the Obedience enjoin'd, as there is betwixt the real *Virtue* and the *Appearance* of *Virtue*. *Outward Conformity* is all required by the One, but *inward Conformity* from the Heart must be added to the *Outward* in the Other.

Your next 28 Pages are spent in making good these Two Points. The

First is, *It is not true that outward Actions, as they affect Society only, are the Matters of human Laws.* The Second



Second is, *This Account given by your Lordship divests the Civil Magistrate and his Laws of all Moral Rectitude. To divest the Magistrate of Moral Rectitude, and to divest Laws of Moral Rectitude I suppose is agreeable to the Reason and Philosophy in Language when 'tis explained; in the mean Time we must guess at the Meaning of it as well as we can.*

His Lordship had said, *That the same individual Outward Action, whether practiced upon the meanest Principle of human Life, or upon the best is the Object of the Magistrate's Care as it affects Society; but 'tis not Religion, not a Law of Christ's—any otherwise than as it is practiced upon a Principle of Religion, and upon the inward sincere belief of a Judgment to come. And again, This is only annexing Sanctions to an Outward Practice, good and beneficial to human Society, let it be founded upon what Motive it will.— This same Outward Practice when it is upon a Principle of Vain-glory or any other worldly Motive, is so far from being Christ's Law, &c. And yet 'tis the Law of Men, as it is the same material Action, useful to Society.*

These being his Lordship's Words which gave Occasion to your Two Propositions, you begin the Proof of your First with this supposal, p. 21—22. *I suppose your Lordship means Outward Actions materially the same with the Outward Actions required by the Laws of Christ, and these you say, are the only proper Matter*

*Matter of human Laws, without ANY regard to the inward Principles or Disposition from which they arise. P. 23. you say, his Lordship teaches, that Outward Actions without regard to the Intention, are the only Object of the Magistrate's Care. And again, Your Lordship says, the Law can take no Notice of the Intention and Motives of the Action. ibid. I cannot but observe upon This,*

First, His Lordship has no where said, what you have thought most fit for your own Purposes to make him say, that the Civil Magistrate can *take no Notice of the Intention* of the Action. He has no where treated of Outward material Actions considered meerly in themselves, and separate from the *Intention* of the Agent. So far is he from this, that His Lordship has all along distinguished betwixt the *Principles* or *Motives* of Practice in order to determine the Difference between the Laws of Christ, and of the Magistrate. Does He not always mention, *the Principle, the Motive* of Outward Actions; nay has he not used One or Other of those Words *Six* Times at least in the two Passages you have cited from him? You complain of my *Candor*, but is this *Justice*, to pretend that his Lordship means only *Outward material Actions* void of *Principle* or *Intention*, like the striking of a Clock, or the Falling of a Stone? 2dly, You have taken a great deal of Pains to shew that the Intention is and ought to be examined into by the Magistrate.

gistrate. His Lordship has no where said any  
 thing to the contrary. 'Tis granted you, that  
 the Intention of the Criminal is the chief  
 Thing to be found out by the Judge. His  
 Tryal is chiefly to learn, if he did commit  
 such and such Facts, and then if he *design'd* to  
 do them. If it be prov'd that he *intended* to  
 kill a Man, he is treated instantly as a Mur-  
 derer. What now is your Inference from this  
 Concession? Is it this, Therefore the Ma-  
 gistrate is judge of *inward Motives and Prin-*  
*ciples*, and has a Power to punish them?  
 The Magistrate has a Right to examine into  
 the *Intention* of an Action, because so far as  
 an Action is *intended*, so far it is a Man's *own*  
 Action; and so far he is accountable for it.  
 But then the Magistrate does not concern him-  
 self with the *Principles* of that *Intention*, or  
 regard Them, farther than as Proofs of the  
*Intention*. A Man, for Instance, is fully per-  
 suaded that the *Pretender* has a Right to the  
 Throne of *Great Brittain*. In Consequence of  
 this Principle he is guilty of some Overt Act  
 of Treason against King *GEORGE*. 'Tis  
 proved upon him that he *intended* to do what  
 he is suppos'd to have done, and upon that it is  
 that the Government executes him. It is not  
 considered whether the Man really *believ'd* the  
*Pretender* to be King *James's* Son or not; or  
 whether he acted upon that Principle or any  
 other: but whether he *design'd* that outward  
 Act which is proved upon him. 3dly. If you  
 oppose



oppose his Lordship, you ought to prove that Civil Authority can reach *beyond* the Outward Practice, and execute its Sanctions upon the Malice of the Heart, which doth *not* break out into Practice, as well as upon That which *does*. His Lordship was shewing the Difference between the Laws of Christ and of the Civil Magistrate, and founds what he says on This, That Christ's Laws require *Outward Practice conducted by inward Sincerity*, and unless the Heart goes along with the Practice, he has annexed no Rewards: On the other Hand the Civil Magistrate annexes his Sanctions to *Outward Practice*, whether it *be*, or be *not*, conducted by *inward Sincerity*, and makes the Usefulness to Society his Measure. My Lord has used, Outward Practice, External Acts, and such like Expressions as they have been us'd a Thousand times by all that ever wrote on this Subject, and the Meaning of the Expression was never, I am persuaded, before mistaken. You are therefore to prove, if you resolve to oppose his Lordship,

IX. That his Lordship has *denied* to the Civil Magistrate a Right to examine whether the Criminal *intended* to commit the Fault which he has committed.

X. That the Laws of the Magistrate can reach to *all* and *every* Practice that the Laws of Christ can, and are *designed* by the Magistrate to *remove inward Evils*.

P. 26, 28. You state *the Truth of the Matter* concerning the Magistrate's Power, and you are clear and express, *that if Men act AS IF they were Honest, He (the Magistrate) has NO REASON to look any farther.* This an indifferent Person would think vastly like his Lordship's Assertion, that *the Magistrate annexed Sanctions to an outward Practice, good and beneficial to human Society, let it be founded upon what Motive it will.* But notwithstanding that, You go on to illustrate by a pretty Similitude, that the Magistrate has to *do with Internal Dispositions*, and that 'tis his *proper Business to remove them.* Nay, you bear a little hard upon him if he *confines his Judgment to external Actions only*, and say expressly, *he would dwindle into a meer State-Mountebank, and his Laws wou'd be meer Beauty-Washes.* Remember, Sir, what 'tis you have told us in this very Page, *that if Men act AS IF they were honest, the Magistrate has no Reason to look any farther:* And, *As long as the Outward Actions are such as they ought to be, supposing the Intention right, he has no Concern to enquire whether the Intention be otherwise.* A Friend of mine upon reading this Page, was so clear that you had directly *contradicted* your self in it, that to prove it, he promis'd to Use your *own Words only*, and obliging me to answer directly to his Questions, He began thus

*Q.* Is it not dealing in Beauty-Washes only, to make People look well whether they are in Health or no ?

*A.* I answered readily, Yes.

*Q.* Is it not the *Physitian's* Care and Business to look farther than mere Outward Appearances ?

*A.* I replied, No doubt it is.

*Q.* Is it not the *Physitian's* proper Business to remove inward Evils ?

*A.* Dr. *Sherlock* says, and very truly, To remove inward Evils is his proper Care.

Now then let us consider the *Magistrate*.

*Q.* Is it not his proper Care and Business to remove internal Evil Dispositions ?

*A.* I must own the Dean says, 'Tis his Business, or he wou'd dwindle into a mere State Mountebank.

*Q.* Pray must not the *Magistrate's* Laws be designed to reach to internal Evils ?

*A.* Certainly, or else his Laws wou'd be mere Beauty-washes.

*Q.* But what if Men act AS IF they were Honest, has the *Magistrate* any Reason to look farther, i. e. to look beyond the Appearance of Honesty ?

*A.* The Dean says expressly, He has NO REASON: He has NO CONCERN to enquire whether the Intention be otherwise.

I hope, said he, I have made out what I propos'd, For by this last Answer 'tis plain, that the *Magistrate* is a meer State-Mountebank,  
if



if he doth not, what he has *NO REASON* to do; and *his Laws are mere Beauty-washes*, if they obtain not what the Magistrate has *no concern to enquire after*. Desire therefore Mr. Dean to prove

XI. That the Magistrate is a mere *State-Mountebank*, and his *Laws mere Beauty washes*, if He doth not, what Mr. Dean says, he has *no Reason to do*.

In P. 28—30. you have been so kind as to acquaint his Lordship *what carried him into his Notion*, viz. *his considering the Magistrate as annexing Positive Rewards to Good Actions*, which, you say, is *rarely the Case*, and the very *Attempt to do it, would be in most Cases absurd and ridiculous*.—If Men do well, the Magistrate looks upon them as *doing their Duty*, in virtue of the *Obligations they are under*, and not as *having a Right to be paid by him for their Goodness or Religion*.—The Reward which those who do well entitle themselves to from the Civil Magistrate is *Peace, Protection and Impunity*.—And therefore when your Lordship speaks of the Magistrate's rewarding particular good Actions by a particular Reward, you argue from a Case that has little Foundation in Fact or Reason.—Good Actions carry their own Reward with them, they secure to the Doers of them the Protection of the Government, from which none are or ought to be excluded but such as do ill.—Were the Ma-

*gistrate to pay a Thousand Pounds for a good Action, he would consider whether it were good or no.*

Upon these Assertions I beg Leave to make the following Observations. First, You grant that in *some Cases*, tho' *rarely*, Positive Rewards *may* be annexed to good Actions. Why then must you *expose* and *ridicule* his Lordship for conceiving it possible to have a *particular good Action* receive a *particular Reward*? His Lordship *argued from a Case* which has *some*, tho' *little Foundation in Reason and Fact*, you say. I put *such a Case* particularly. You tell the World therefore *that I have shewn my self capable of writing a Book upon a Subject I do not understand*. How did I shew That? Why, truly by arguing upon a Case which you your self grant sometimes happens, *viz. the annexing positive Rewards to particular good Actions*. 2dly. By the Magistrate's *Sanctions* annexed to Religion You, Sir, generally must mean *Punishments*, not *Rewards*. Here you have spent no less than Three Pages in proving, that *the very Attempt to annex positive Rewards to good Actions would be in most Cases absurd and ridiculous*; and I persuade my self, you are not for the Magistrate's doing what you think *absurd and ridiculous*. But besides this general Reasoning, you observe here, That *the Civil Magistrate encourages Virtue, even as it is beneficial to Society, by punishing Offences against it; he encourages Sobriety*

*briety by punishing Drunkenness: RELIGION and PIETY by punishing IRRELIGION and PROFANENESS.* P. 28. I would ask, If this be the Magistrate's method of *encouraging Religion*, viz. punishing Irreligion, what is meant by that *Complaint* in the *Report* against the Bishop of Bangor, that he is *against encouraging Religion by Temporal Rewards*? What *Temporal Rewards* are you, or *can* you be for, who tell us 'tis *absurd* and *ridiculous* to have any, nay that the *Encouragement* of Religion is by *punishing Irreligion*? The Bishop of Bangor was accused in the *Report* For *impugning the Supremacy*. How did he do That? Why by a Consequence drawn from some Propositions in his Sermon, *he declares That to encourage Religion by Temporal Rewards is to act contrary to the Interest of true Religion.* Report P. 16, 17. You here tell us, First, that the Laws of Christ are the same with the Moral Law. Then, *Positive Rewards to good Actions have little Foundation in Fact or Reason*; and lastly, That in most Cases 'twou'd be *absurd* and *ridiculous* to annex Rewards. Nay lest the Reader should imagine that Religion might be one of the Cases that you except, you tell us the Magistrate *encourages Religion by punishing Irreligion*. Is this declaring against *temporal Rewards* for Religion, or not? Is not this declaring it *absurd* and *ridiculous* to *encourage Religion by particular positive Rewards*? Happy Mr. Dean of Chichester, that  
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can *openly* call that *absurd* and *ridiculous*, for which he can *prosecute* one of his Superiors with Applause! But this is not all. You add, *If Men do well, the Magistrate looks upon them as doing their Duty—and not as having a Right to be paid by him for their Goodness or RELIGION.* 'Tis *absurd* and *ridiculous* you say, to annex positive Rewards to Good Actions; To annex *Tithes* to the Duty of the Clergy is to annex positive Rewards to good Actions; Therefore 'tis according to you *absurd* and *ridiculous*. I leave you to consider how far this Argument of yours affects the *Established Church*, and shall only add that you have proved, P. 13, 14. in a set Paragraph, that 'tis lawful to charge *Consequences upon a Doctrine which the Writer had not in his Thoughts* 3dly. *The Reward, you say, which those that do well, entitle themselves to from the Civil Magistrate is Peace, Protection and Impunity, all which they forfeit as soon as they do ill.* Is this all the Reward, all the *Encouragement* that you allow without the Magistrate's acting *absurd* and *ridiculous*? Or can you say that the Bishop of *Bangor* is against This? Is it criminal in him to allow *this*, and to plead for *all this*; and can you be his *Accuser* and *Condemner*, when you allow and plead for just the same? 4thly, You add, that more than this *has little Foundation in Fact or Reason.* If you allow that those who are of the *true Religion do well*, I ask whether Religion has not been encourag

encouraged by particular positive Sanctions ever since *Constantine's* days? Whether or no *Fact* therefore is not against you? Is *Reason* against *Fact*, or no, in that Case? Lastly, whether *Fact* and *Reason* too have not been together in annexing *positive Rewards to particular good Actions* in all Countries yet known? 5thly, You lay it down as a Rule, That *the Reward of those that do well is Peace, Protection, and Impunity, and that none ought to be excluded from the Protection of the Government, but those who do ill.* Do They then who differ from the Magistrate in *religious Opinions* do ill? If they *do well*, you say their Reward is *Peace, Protection, and Impunity.* You must not think to evade the plain Question, *Do they ill or well* in following their Consciences, even in Opposition to the Magistrate, in religious Opinions? If they *do well*, they are intitled to *Impunity*: Consequently all those Laws which lay Men under Inconveniences for their Opinions, different from the Established Opinions, ought to be *removed*; unless you can prove that real Inconveniences upon the sole Account of Opinions is consistent with *Impunity.* Lastly, What is it that you mean by saying, *Were the Magistrate to pay 1000 l. for a good Action, he would consider whether it were good or no.* Can a Man of your Abilities descend so low as to play with an ambiguous Word, and thus abuse your Reader? Is the Term, *Good*, used always in the *Moral Sense*?  
Or

Or is it not a *Good* Action, and always call'd so, to save one's Country from Ruin? *Good* to the People saved, and worthy of Reward. But yet if the Man perform'd this Action from a Principle of Vain-Glory, or any secret selfish Designs, the Action is not *good*, *i. e.* morally good. Were the Magistrate therefore to reward such an Action, would he search into the *Morality* of the Act, or ought he to look beyond the *apparent* Design and Tendency of the Man? And when the Magistrate rewards *Evidences* for discovering their Accomplices, does he consider the *Morality* of the Act, or the Persons Conscience and Opinion? You are therefore to prove,

XII. That to *annex positive Rewards to particular good Actions*, has little *Foundation in Fact or Reason*, and is, in most Cases, *absurd and ridiculous*.

XIII. That to *encourage Religion by positive Temporal Rewards* is not *absurd and ridiculous* upon your Scheme.

XIV. That those *do ill*, who differ from the Magistrate in Religious Opinions, and therefore are not entitled to *Impunity*. Or if you say they *do well*, you must prove it *agreeable to Impunity*, to lay Men under Inconveniences for their Opinions in Religion.

Before I proceed, I must remove an Objection which you make *p. 30.* I assure your Lordship, that a *Natural Right to a Place at Court* is a *very new Notion*. This was occasioned I  
guess



guess by what I said 2d Lett. p. 56. *Whether Dissenters are not deprived of a Natural Right by Negative Discouragements. And whether the Loss of a Natural Right by a Positive Law be not a Positive Punishment: Your Locks and Bolts are not designed to deprive Men of what they have an equal Natural Right to, but to keep Men from taking what they have no Right to.* I used the Word *Natural Right* in the Sence which the best Writers very frequently do. *Grotius* observes, *de Jure Belli & Pac. c. 1, 10. 3. Quadam dici Juris Naturalis quibus Jus Naturale non repugnat.* Some things are said to be of Natural Right, which Natural Right doth not clash with. The Thing intended by the Term is that One Man is *equally* capable with Another of any Place to serve his Country, if he be *equally* honest, and *equally* able. That which assures me that we mean the same Thing, though you dislike the Word, is, that you assert that the Magistrate ought not to hurt Men for Opinions, *i. e.* he ought not to incapacitate Men for their Opinions, if to incapacitate is a real *Hurt* to them. A *Natural Right* therefore is allowed by all in this Sence, who do not think that Religious Opinions are the Subjects of Force, and exclusive of a Capacity to serve the Publick. *i. e.* That a Christian ought to have been excluded from serving the *Roman* Emperors before *Constantine's* Time, a Protestant now in *France*, an Episcopalian purely on that Account in *Holland* or *Scotland*.

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You next consider, p. 31, 32. *the Authority of Scripture appealed to by his Lordship.* The Thing to be proved by his Lordship was, *that the Sanctions of the Magistrate considered as a Magistrate, are no more than the Sanctions of human and social Laws.* And he instances in *the Sanctions of the Roman Magistrate as they are described by St. Paul, Rom. 13. before the Magistrate knew any thing of Christ, nay when he was an Enemy to the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom.*

Your Reply is, *Will it follow that because the Magistrate, who knew nothing of Christ, did not add Sanctions to the Laws of Christ, therefore the Magistrate who does know him, cannot add Sanctions to Christ's Laws?* It will follow upon your Principles justly, as absurd as it is. For if the Magistrate's Law and Christ's Law be the very self-same Law, then as often as the Magistrate adds Sanctions to his *own* Laws, which are in Matter the same with *Christ's* Laws, he adds Sanctions to Christ's Laws. Or thus, *The Roman Governor's Laws were many of them Moral Laws, p. 32. or Laws of Reason and Nature; Christ's Laws are almost all Laws of Reason and Nature, Therefore the Roman Governor's Laws were Laws of Christ.* Either then allow this Consequence absurd and ridiculous as it is in it self, though just and true upon your Principles, or else acknowledge another thing, *viz.* That the Consequence which you charged upon  
upon

upon his Lordship in your *Answer*, p. 24. and which in your *Considerations* you pretend to vindicate, p. 14, 15 ; *That the World must be torn to Pieces without Remedy if the Magistrate cannot add Sanctions to the Laws of Christ ;* that this Consequence, I say, is absurd, since the World was *not* torn to pieces when the Magistrate did *not* add Sanctions to Christ's Laws.

You have a second Reply, *St. Paul requires Obedience to some Laws relating to Government in the 13<sup>th</sup> to the Romans. They too are the Roman Governors Laws ; are they then become Laws of Christ's, or not ?* I answer, the Laws required by *St. Paul* there, are the Laws of Christ. *If they are, say you, then the Magistrate's Laws may be the Laws of Christ, and by Parity of Reason Christ's Laws may be the Magistrate's Laws.* I reply, The Magistrate's Laws are the *same* as to the *Matter* of them only ; and by Parity of Reason Christ's Laws are the *same* with the Magistrate's Laws in the *Matter* only. Christ and the Civil Magistrate are Two distinct Legislators, their Laws are made for different Ends, the Sanctions of their Laws are quite different, and the Obedience to be paid to them is quite different, and yet the Laws are the very *same* to Mr. Dean, because the *Matter* is the *same*.

A third Difficulty is started upon this Topic, and repeated again more fully, p. 55. Here 'tis thus, *Is there any Difference in this Case between the Laws of God and of Christ ?*



*The Roman Governour's Laws were not Laws of Christ, considered under the Formality of Christ's Laws; but many of them were Laws of God: Unless your Lordship will affirm, that the Moral Law is not the Law of God, or that the Roman Magistrate encouraged no Part of the Moral Law by his Sanctions.— You must shew that the Moral Laws encouraged by the Magistrate are not the Laws of God, any more than the Laws of Christ, attended with Temporal Sanctions, are the Laws of Christ. To this I reply,*

*First, As you grant that the Roman Governour's Laws were not the Laws of Christ, so neither were they the Moral Law: And this plain Reason will evince it to you; viz. The Moral Law requires internal Obedience, p. 55. The Roman Magistrate's Law required only external Obedience, therefore the Moral and the Roman Magistrate's Law were not the same. 2dly, No Man is tried in Civil Courts or punished for violating the Law of Nature, strictly and properly so call'd, but for the Breach of Civil and Social Laws, of such as affect the Peace and Quiet of the Subject, and have civil Sanctions annex'd to them. He is a good Subject that obeys the Law of the Land, and acts as that obliges him; but yet he would be far from a good Subject to the Law of Nature, who did no more than what the Civil Law compell'd him to, by its Sanctions annex'd to the Matter of the Moral Law. But*  
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3dly, The Moral Law receives not its Power of *Obliging* Men to Conformity to it from any Authority, Law, or Command of Men; no, not from any Law or Command of God himself. But it obliges rational Creatures, antecedent to all Punishments, by the eternal and unchangeable nature of Things. In consequence of which eternal necessary Obligation, God himself is obliged by it, and makes it the Rule of all his Actions. God therefore making us as he has, and giving us the Powers of Perceiving and Judging, and of Freedom, has as plainly discovered it to be his Will, that we should act according to this Rule; and by making us to consist of Bodies as well as Souls, he has made natural Rewards and Punishments the necessary Consequences of the Observation or Breach of the Moral Law. Happiness is in the Nature of Things, the Consequence of Virtue, as Misery is of Vice, and these are the Sanctions by God annexed to this Law. And thus in both these respects, as God governs himself by it, and is obliged to do so, and as he has made Man as he has, *the Laws of Nature and Reason are the Laws of God.* P. 55. Should the Magistrate now imagine himself to be the Judge of this Law, and that *'tis his Business to see that Obedience be paid to its Dictates, with respect to God as well as Men, and that Offences against it be punished,* as you tell us it is, *Ans.* p. 5. he must be furnished with proper *Faculties, or Powers* by God, to  
*know*

*know* when *Offences* are *committed* and when not; and he must be *able* to punish *all* *Offences* against it. To say that 'tis *his* *Business* to see that *Obedience* be paid to it, and to punish *Offences* against it, and to grant that some Parts of it *cannot* be judged of by him, is to say, 'tis his *Business* to do what 'tis *impossible* he should do; and that he *must* punish what he *cannot* know. You assert p. 55. that the *Moral Law* requires *internal Obedience*, and no doubt 'tis not *Virtue* which doth not proceed from a *Pure Heart*. Can the Magistrate judge of *this*; or can he punish *Offences* against it? If 'tis the Magistrate's *Business* to punish *Offences* against the Law of Nature, the Magistrate becomes a Criminal before God if he doth not *punish such Offences*. The Magistrate is therefore guilty of a great Crime, if he punishes not **INSOLENCE** and **PRIDE**, and **HAUGHTINESS**, let it proceed from what Bottom it will, whether it be *natura Vitium* or *Animi*; for **INSOLENCE** or **PRIDE** or **HAUGHTINESS** are as much Breaches of the *Law of Reason*, or the *Moral Law*, as any other.

You'll be ready to say, as you did before, about the Laws of Christ, Will it follow that because the Magistrate cannot punish in some Cases, that *where he does know* the Offence he *cannot add his Sanctions*? P. 31. and That *where there are* sufficient Indications to judge by, *the reason limiting his Power ceases*. P. 27. I

reply,



reply, suppose a PROUD and HAUGHTY Conduct displaid it self very visibly, so visibly, that nothing but Zeal and Prejudice could pretend to justify it; suppose too further, that such Conduct was founded upon this Principle, 'Tis lawful thus to treat one who in my Opinion has injured me: Such a Conduct I say is plainly contrary to the Law of Christ, and therefore contrary to the *Moral Law*, which is the *same* with the Law of Christ; and as 'tis, upon Supposition, a *visible* Breach of the *Moral Law*, 'tis the Magistrate's *Business* to *punish* it. Will You, Sir, assert this to be true, and allow its Consequences where-e're they fall?—

The Truth is, 'Tis *not* the Magistrate's *Business* to see *that* Obedience be paid to the Dictates of the Law of Reason, and *that* Offences against it be punished. For the Rule of Duty is of much greater Extent than that of the Magistrate's Laws. Piety, Humanity, Liberality, Justice, Fidelity require of us abundance of Things, which publick Laws can never reach to. Seneca de Ira. l. 2. c. 37. All Men ought to be governed by the Moral Law, and all are accountable to God, and to him *alone*, for Offences against it. The Magistrate's Business is to protect his Subjects from Injuries, to secure them in their Liberties and Properties, and in order to this to command such Rules of Action as are most fit and best adapted to those Ends. His Laws are no more the *Moral Law*, than  
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the private Injunctions of any private Person to his own Servants are the *Law* of the Land, though as to the *Matter of them* they may be the same. The Law of the Land annexes Hanging to stealing. Suppose a private Person when he contracts with a Servant, tells him, that if he steals to the Value of five Shillings from him, he shall forfeit his Year's Wages. Is this private Contract, which is a *Law* to the Person so obliged, the *very same Law* with the Law of the Land? Or is it more so than in respect of the *Matter* only? The Magistrate cannot exact any thing *contrary* to the Moral Law, more than a Private Man can make private Laws contrary to the Law of the Land. The Magistrate's Power is to direct the Force of the Commonwealth for its Good, and therefore his Laws are not the *Moral Law*, of which he *cannot* in all Cases judge, but are *Social Laws*, of which he *can* judge in all Cases: They are such as by an *external* Compliance will obtain the End they are made for, and not such as cannot obtain their End by such a Conformity as he is proper Judge of. You are therefore still to prove,

XV. That the Magistrate's *Business* is to see that the Moral Law be obey'd, and to *punish* Offences against That.

XVI. Since you grant, That the Magistrate who knew nothing of Christ, *did not add* Sanctions to the Laws of Christ, p. 31. You  
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are to shew that the World *MUST* be torn in pieces without Remedy, if the Magistrate cannot add Sanctions to Christ's Laws.

Your next four Pages are spent partly upon the *Impropriety* of the Instance of *Charity* to explain His Lordship's Meaning; and partly in *ridiculing* it, with an Air becoming a Man of *Abilities*, and a Decency peculiar to Mr. Dean of *Chichester*. When the Fit of Humour was off a little, you could see and own too that the Case of *Charity*, upon *Motives of Vain-Glory* was stated in the *Postscript*, p. 29. I ask you then with what Conscience or Honesty you could talk, as you do, about *Stock-jobbing*, and *Charity*, sometimes near Par, sometimes much below it. Were the Question indeed about the Advantages or Disadvantages of a Law, proposing a Reward of *Charity* in specifick Terms, you might have justly displayed your Talent in *Stock-jobbing*; but as a Case was only put in order to explain a Doctrine, which was clearly explained too by the Instance, your Skill in *Brokeridge* was just as *pertinently* applied, as if you had recounted your Exploits when you was a *Justice of the Peace*.

His Lordship said, *The outward Action of distributing Money, or Necessaries which may supply the Want of Others, let it be upon what Principle it will goes under the General Name of Charity.* This was to be *expos'd* and *ridiculed*; and in order to that, *perverted*: Indeed, my Lord, this is great News: I never

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heard



heard that giving Money upon what Motive soever was Charity. Good Sir, who ever said it was strictly and properly Charity? Did the Bishop say so? Or is it Justice to charge him with it? Are not his Words express, *Goes under the general Name of Charity*? Does not that imply that 'tis *not properly* Charity? Was it not the Design of the Instance to shew that the same outward Action, when commanded by a Law of Men, and with the Sanctions of Men, is not Religion; but when it was performed upon an internal Principle of Duty and of Obedience to a Law of Christ, then only it was a Religious Act? You was to prove that *distributing Money upon the Motive of Vain-Glory*, or such like Principles did not *go under the Name of Charity*, or that if it were *Charity*, 'twas the same which Christ commanded and will reward. Instead of that, you very judiciously choose to expose and ridicule an Attempt to *reward* Charity. Pray, Sir, in your next be pleased to prove, there is no such Thing as *Transmutation of Metals*, and you'll talk just as much to the purpose.

You say indeed, *That barely giving of Money is no Law of Christ*. 33. But is not the giving Money to supply the Wants of others a Law or Command of Christ? Is it ridiculous, so monstrously ridiculous, to assert this, that you thought it not improper to *make* His Lordship say, in a manner as foolish as you could represent him, *Look ye now, is not this*

*a Law of Christ ?* The Question is, Whether the Instance of Charity is not properly enough applied to convey the Ideas of what was discours'd of to you. You deny it upon this Reason, p. 55. *The Reason why the outward Act would not be Charity, is not because the Laws of Christ cannot be encouraged by the Civil Power ; but because in the Nature of the Thing there is a Difference between Giving and Selling.* 'Tis, I hope, at last agreed by you that the Nature of Things differs according to the Circumstances. But let me tell you, This is what His Lordship pleads for, and makes it a Fundamental Distinction in his Postscript. Is it not evident then, That since in the Nature of the Thing there is a Difference between outward Acts according to the Motives of them, and the Magistrate cannot come at that internal Circumstance, which makes it a Compliance to the Law of Christ, that therefore He cannot annex Sanctions to the Laws of Christ.

I would not go out of the Way so far as to cite Authorities in behalf of this Expression of His Lordship, which you have taken so much Pains to expose, were it not to shew you that His Lordship has spoken, as is not unusual upon this Subject, when he says the Magistrate's Power *can reach to outward Practice alone.* Puffendorff *De Officio, &c. Pref.* says, *Forum humanum circa externas tantum hominis Actiones occupatur.* Again in his *Eris Scadica*, p. 262.

*Forum humanum circa externas hominis Actiones occupatur.* Of which Words His Lordship's are a literal Translation. You your self once said, 'Tis the Magistrate's proper Business to consider the Actions of Men with regard to publick Peace and Order, without respecting from what INTERNAL Principle they flow. Sermon Nov. 5th, p. 10, which is in reality the same with what His Lordship has taught.

Your Second Proposition p. 36. is, *This Account given by Your Lordship divests the Civil Magistrate's Laws of all Moral Rectitude.* A Proposition pleasant enough, considering the Use which is to be made of it; for when a Reader is to be confounded, 'tis very proper to talk agreeably only to the *Philosophy of Language*, i. e. to utter Sounds and leave the Reader to find a Meaning to them if he can. To divest the Magistrate of moral Rectitude, or to divest a Law of moral Rectitude, are Expressions so peculiar, that 'tis not for nothing that you have chosen to speak in this manner.

But whatever is your Meaning, The Design of the Proposition is to shew the Absurdity of what you say, His Lordship has taught, viz. *That the Magistrate in the Execution of his Laws concerns himself only with outward Material Actions, without any View or Regard to inward Motives and Principles.* p. 37. You did well to put in a Parenthesis, (*the Words have been already*



*already produc'd*), from whence you have deduced this Notion of your own, for I assure you I have not yet been able to find such Doctrine in his Lordship's Postscript. His Lordship has told us that the *Magistrate's Authority can reach only to Outward Practice, good and beneficial to human Society, to reward it, or if bad to Society, to punish it, let it arise from or be founded upon what Motive it will*: you upon this make him judge of *only outward Material Actions*, without regarding the *Intention* of the Man to perform such or such Actions: You wou'd have the Bishop's Notion amount to this, that the outward material Action of a Man is considered by Civil Authority, just as the Striking of a Clock, or the Fall of a Stone is; and that he has no Right to examine any farther in the least, no not if the Man *design'd* or *Intended* to do what he has done more than if a Clock *design'd* to strike or a Stone *intended* to fall. By this Doctrine which you have made for his Lordship, you say *the Magistrate and his Laws are divested of Moral Rectitude*.

But pray what is *this Moral Rectitude of Laws and Magistrates*? From what you say, p. 39—40, perhaps 'tis possible to guess your Meaning. 'Tis not *the Aptness in the Action to serve the Publick Good which gives it a due Perfection, with respect to the Magistrate*. 'Tis not *a relative Goodness in human Actions, with regard to the Publick*. These are not sufficient  
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to give an Action its *Moral Rectitude*. What then is it? What is it that gives an Action the Denomination of *Good* with regard to the *Publick*? This you tell us must be the *Real or Moral Goodness of an Action*. But is not a *Relative Goodness* in the Laws and in the Magistrate sufficient? Is there any other than a *Relative Goodness* in Laws? Is it possible to give to *Laws* any other *Moral Rectitude*? Or may you not plead for the *Moral Rectitude* of Houses, Stocks and Stones by the same methods as you plead for the *Moral Rectitude* of Laws, since Houses, Stocks and Stones are equally intelligent Agents with Laws? You must therefore prove

XVII. That Laws are capable of other Rectitude than *relative Goodness*.

XVIII. That the *Fitness of an Action to serve the Publick Good*, gives it not a *due Perfection with respect to the Magistrate*.

You must not imagine, Sir, that you have proved your Point, if you pretend to urge, that an Action morally Evil may accidentally and in particular Cases serve some good Purposes of the Publick; and that Vice ought to be encouraged and rewarded if it can be made *useful* to Society. An Action Evil in it self can never be *beneficial* or *useful* to the Publick but necessarily and in the Nature of Things must be destructive of the Commonweal. To serve a *present Turn* only is not serving the *Publick Good*, more than removing the present

Pain of the Gout by Methods which will necessarily make it return with *double* Violence, or drive it from the Extrems of the Body to the Head and Stomach, can be call'd *beneficial* or *useful* to a Man.

But you put it to his Lordship to consider, whether the Magistrate ought to reward an Action which he knows to proceed from — any inordinate Affection, because it happens to serve the Publick. P. 40. Ought, Sir, the exerting in a particular manner the Conduct and Courage of a General, intending to serve the Publick, and moved at the same time with a Principle of Vain-Glory, to be rewarded or not? Such *Acts* are and ought to be rewarded, not because they *happen*, or in the Event *prove* to serve the Publick, but because they are *design'd* for, and are in the Nature of things beneficial to Society. Let the Motive be what it will in a particular Person, if an Action tends in its Nature to promote the Good of Society, and he designs it, it ought to be rewarded. The outward Practice of Courage, Prudence, Justice, or any other Virtue tends directly to procure the Safety, and to establish the Peace and Quiet of Society. If any Person excels but in These, his Actions have in them a *relative Goodness*; and those who reap the Benefits of them, are certainly obliged to their Benefactor. If *appearing* Virtuous Actions are sullied with Motives which in the Eye of God who searches the Heart, destroy their *Moral Rectitude*,



tude, the Man is accountable to God alone for them: But by Men Actions are considered in another Light, and their Rewards are proportioned according to the Benefits receiv'd. You call this Conduct *out-doing Matchiavel's Politicks*, p. 40. *propagating Impiety, and Contempt of Sacred Things, rewarding Actions Evil in themselves*, and you insinuate that the Man who teaches this, *is a worse Enemy to the State than the poor Rogue who robs on the High-Way*. These are Artifices worthy of your Cause, which will appear more flagrant still when you prove,

XIX. That to encourage outward Actions beneficial to Society, is to encourage *Actions Evil in themselves, to propagate Impiety, and a Contempt of things Sacred*.

You next declaim for Five Pages together, 40—45, *against this Position, That 'tis the Magistrate's Office to take Care of the Publick Good*, and say, *You will hardly find One of any Reputation, who has made that Use of it which your Lordship and your Friend have made*. There is One Man, Sir, of great *Abilities* whose Name alone is sufficient to stamp Authority upon what he says, I hope, with you, who happens to have made Use of This very Principle that his Lordship and I have; nay happens to talk of *External Actions* too as the *only* Objects of the Magistrate's Care, just as his Lordship and I have done. I mean your own self, and in the very Sermon, Nov. 5. which  
has

has occasioned this Controversy. The Passages shall be produced in another Place. *v. Append.*

Here you observe, That *Religion chiefly affects the Publick Good, and is consequently a necessary Part of the Magistrate's Care. p. 41. That the Heathen Moralists laid the Foundation of Civil Society in the Principles of Religion;—and what Pains some Christian Politicians have taken to make Religion—unnecessary to the Being or Well-being of Civil Government. ibid.* Good Sir, who are those *Christian Politicians* who have done so? Has his Lordship done it? Or have I, whom you have call'd, and I assure you I esteem it an Honour to be call'd, his Lordship's *Friend*? Is it denying Religion to be necessary to the *Being or Well-being of Society*, to say that the Magistrate cannot annex his Sanctions to the Laws of Christ? Is it denying it necessary, to assert that *Civil Authority can reach to outward Practices only*? Or is it *propagating Impiety*, p. 42, to insist upon it that Outward Actions beneficial to Society ought to be rewarded? Is it saying that *Religion has no Influence on the Publick Happiness*, to assert that Temporal Sanctions ought to be confined to the Magistrate's Kingdom, and thrown out of Christs? I wou'd desire you to prove, and I here call upon you to prove.

XX. That to Deny the Magistrate's Power to annex Sanctions to Christ's Laws, or to assert that the Civil Authority can reach no far-

ther than Outward Practices, is to deny that Religion influences the Publick Happiness.

You are pleas'd, p. 42, to advise his Lordship *to consult the SACRED HISTORY rather than an imaginary State of Nature, concerning the Duty of Government.* You can't in Conscience sure desire his Lordship to be govern'd by *imaginary* History, if you forbid him to be guided by an *imaginary* State of Nature. What Authority has this Speech of *Noah*; that this is made the Standard of his Lordship's Thoughts upon Government? Is it not pure *Imagination* of your own, tho' 'tis represented as SACRED HISTORY. When Men of Wit and strong Imagination consult the sacred History, they consult it, not to find what God *has* said; but fancy what he *ought* to say. *Noah* might reasonably be suppos'd to answer thus and thus! You shou'd have said, Dean Sherlock might be suppos'd to answer thus, *i. e.* to talk Sense, but no more to the purpose than if he had talked Nonsense. For tho' you say *the Publick Good is concern'd in the Religion of the People*, p. 43, and, *is a necessary Part of the Magistrate's Care*, yet you have told us too p. 28, that *'tis absurd and ridiculous even to attempt to annex positive Rewards to good Actions*; That *they carry their own Reward with them*, p. 30. And that all the Encouragement we can give to Virtue, *is to punish Offences against it.* You should have made *Noah* representing to us the Magistrate's Authority



thority in Matters of Religion, what he *can* do, and what he *cannot*, and the *Old Patriarch* might have been allowed to *talk good Sense*, and to the Purpose too.

*But let the Publick Good*, say you, p. 44. *or or any thing else—be the Object of the Magistrate's Case*, yet whilst his Lordship maintains that *Material Actions only are required*, He *must exclude Morality from the Law*. It has been observ'd already that the *Intention* of the Agent is always examined into by the Magistrate, tho' the *Principle* of the Intention is not. But how is it that you prove that *Morality is excluded from the Law* here? Thus. *The Magistrate has no Judgment of the Goodness or Badness of his Subjects, but only of the Consequences of their Actions to the Publick*. Supposing that, What then? *Then the Roman Emperor was in the right to make his Horse Consul*. Why so? Had that Horse a *Judgment of the Consequences of Actions to the Publick*? *Caligula* design'd indeed to make his Horse Consul. But the Dean of *Chichester* was the first who ever attributed a *Judgment of the Consequences of Actions* for the Publick Good to that Emperor's Horse. If outward Actions only are required by Law, then the Emperor was *certainly in the right*, you say, to make his Horse Consul. p. 45. Could the Horse judge of such a Law? No doubt he could in Mr. Dean's Opinion, or else the Emperor was *certainly not in the right*. A Man of *Wit* is al-

way an entertaining Adversary, and if he can but say a *smart* Thing, no matter whether it be to the purpose or not.

But if I am *unhappy upon the Subject of the Laws of Reason and Christ*, give me leave to say you have not shewn your self very *happy* whenever you meddle with *Roman Antiquities*. Where is it that you find that the *Roman Emperor* actually *made* his *Horse Consul*? 'Tis reported that he design'd to do it, says One; He promised to do it, and had done it if he had lived longer, says another. But that he actually *did* do it, is only I believe, in the same History that *Noah's Speech* to his Sons is.

You have still left one remarkable Reason why the *Laws for promoting publick Good—must take in more than mere external Actions*. 'Tis this, *The Laws of Reason and Morality are superior to the Considerations of publick Good, since Publick Good is subject to be regulated by them*: Consequently the *Laws for promoting Publick Good*, must be *Laws of Reason and Morality*. P. 45. Why so? Will you allow this Consequence to be good, The *Laws of the Land* are superior to the *Considerations of the Good of a Family*, since the *Good of a Family* is subject to be regulated by them; consequently the *Rules of Action for promoting the good of a Family* must be the *Laws of the Land*. The *Rules of Action* 'tis plain need not be the *Laws of the Land*, but must only be not *contrary to them*. Ha-

Having thus examined your *Two Propositions*, the rest of your Book will be dispatched with greater Brevity.

P. 46, 47. you examine this Assertion of his Lordship, *One natural Consequence from the whole Tenor of the Sermon it self, is, That 'tis the true and proper Business of the Magistrate to concern himself with the Outward Practice of Virtue.* You was never so puzzled, you say, in your *Life with a natural Consequence*, and therefore you bring 2 or 3 Reasons to prove that there can be none.

If you consider the Fundamental Principles of the Sermon, I am apt to think the *Consequence* will be very *natural*, that the Civil Magistrate's Authority *can* reach and ought to reach to the outward Practice of Virtue. 'Tis implied in the very Notion of *King*, that he should be the Lawgiver to his Subjects, and that he should be Judge of their Behaviour towards his Laws, and that he should annex his Sanctions to his Laws, *i. e.* that he should be empower'd to reward or punish his Subjects according to their Conduct and Obedience. Their Obedience to his Laws is no more than outward Conformity, because his Laws do not reach to the Heart and Mind of his Subjects. His Authority therefore ought to reach to outward Practices, because outward Practices are properly his Business. But you tell us, that *Outward Practice is incapable of Reward, because destitute of Morality, i. e.* A Man is not  
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capable of receiving a Reward be he never so serviceable to his Country, if the Internal Principles upon which he acts be not strictly and *morally good*, or if he doth his Services upon any secret Temporal Ends: For then his Actions cease to be really virtuous. But your pleasantest Reason is this, the *Outward Practice to which Civil Authority reaches, is no Practice of Virtue*: Therefore the Tenor of the Sermon can never shew, that the Magistrate ought to concern himself with the Outward Practice of Virtue. A Consequence which you are desired to prove,

XXI. Outward Practice of Virtue is no Practice of Virtue, Therefore the Outward Practice of Virtue cannot be rewarded.

I pass now to the Syllogism drawn up against you by His Lordship in These Words, P. S. p. 86, *Temporal Punishments*, you affirm, are not proper to enforce the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom. But many of the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom as to the Matter of them, (for so only we can mean) are Laws of Reason and of great Importance to Society. Therefore, according to you, for the Magistrate to enforce by Temporal Penalties these Laws, which yet are the Laws of human Society, is not at all proper, but indeed contrary to the Nature of Christ's Kingdom.

The First Proposition, you answer, is as fit to support any thing else, as the Conclusion drawn from it. p. 50.

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The Reason you give is remarkable enough *viz.* That you expressly said in the Sermon, from whence that Proposition is taken, That it ought to be remembred that the Arguments drawn from the Nature of Religion and of Christ's Spiritual Kingdom against the Use of Temporal Punishments, are conclusive only as to the Ministers of that Kingdom, and cannot extend to the Civil Magistrate.

When you have cited this *Contradictory* Clause from your Sermon, you cry out, *Is this fair Usage of an Adversary, and a good manner of Writing?* I am sorry the Cause wants such Supports, and more sorry that your Lordship should condescend to use such.

I shew'd you, Sir, in my second Letter to you, p. 57. that whether you would extend it to the Magistrate or not, the Argument necessarily extends it self to him. *Temporal Punishments are not proper to enforce the Laws of Christ.* This is your Position express and clear. If they are not *proper* in themselves for that End, the Magistrate cannot *make* them *proper*, more than the Clergy. But I refer the Reader to the Letter before-mentioned. Here you assert a *Right* to the Magistrate to enforce the Laws of Christ's Kingdom by Temporal Punishments. By the same Method that you assert this, when you come to be press'd with the Consequences of it, you may reply, that *in the Sermon it self and not afterwards, when you found there was Occasion for it, you*  
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had maintain'd, That *Temporal Punishments* are not proper to enforce the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom. However, since you are dispos'd to maintain the present Position now, 'Twill follow from it, First, That every Christian Magistrate has a Right to enforce What *he thinks* the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom. For every Christian Magistrate believing his *own* Religion to be the *true* one, and according to the Laws of Jesus Christ, he will have a Right to enforce That; and consequently *Lewis* the 14th, ought not to be discommended for exerting his *Right* to enforce the Laws of Christ when he dragoon'd his Subjects. Secondly, If the Magistrate has a Right to enforce the Laws of Christ by *Temporal Punishments*, He must have this Right from Christ. But Christ has no where authoriz'd the Magistrate to exert his Power, to enforce the Laws of Christ's Kingdom. On the contrary he accepts of no Services as done to him but what are our own; what proceed from a willing Choice, and a Heart affected by the Belief of a future Judgment. Thirdly, If the Magistrate has a Right to enforce the Laws of Christ by Temporal Punishments, he must have a Right to make Means *improper* in the Nature of things fit and proper to attain their End. He must have a Power to make Violence convince the Judgment, and Necessity produce the Love of God. He must be capable of making external Signs without the inward



ward Disposition acceptable to God. For it cannot be conceived, that God should give the Civil Magistrate a Power to *enforce* the Laws of Christ, if he would not accept the *Produce* of *Force*, and impute the Fruits of *Compulsion* for Righteousness. Fourthly, 'Tis impossible that the Civil Magistrate can *enforce* the Laws of Christ, unless he has a Right to interpret the Laws of Christ for all his Subjects, or unless he can share with God the Power of *searching Hearts*. You must own it very *unjust* to punish a Man who professes his *Readiness* to obey the Laws of Christ, under the Pretence of *making* him obey them. The Man is ready to part with Money, Liberty or even Life itself to testify the Sincerity of his Heart, and to observe the Laws of Christ, in the best manner, and in the way which he thinks that Christ has appointed. When the Civil Magistrate is not satisfied with this, but requires another sort of Obedience than what the Conscience dictates, 'tis not the Laws of Christ, but those of the Magistrate, which are *enforc'd* under the specious Pretence of the *Edicts* of Jesus Christ. The Magistrate must therefore be capable of searching Hearts, or else he may punish a Man for Disobedience, who strictly does *obey* the Laws of Christ; *i. e.* instead of enforcing the Laws of Christ, he forces Men to disobey them. If on the other Hand, he has a Right to *interpret* the Laws of Christ for his Subjects, then *every* Magistrate will claim

this Right; and the King of *France's* Dragoons, and the Inquisition in *Portugal*, and *Schism* Bills here will be strictly just.

You must not here pretend that the Civil Magistrate has a Right to enforce the *true* Religion, or to cover the Nakedness of your Notion with That, as you have done in your *Answer* in several Places, p. 20, 26, &c. No Arguments which you can produce, will hold good to prove that the Magistrate may enforce *true* Religion, but will equally prove it lawful to enforce a *false* one. You can assign no Privilege to *Truth*, which an *erroneous* Conscience will not claim, and consequently you may begin to enforce or persecute as soon as you please, and cover your Designs with as specious Pretences as you can; Error in its Turn will challenge all and every Prerogative to its self, as you can to Truth, and will have the same Right to be *enforced* that Truth can have. But *true Religion* is so much the Concern of all Mankind, and so readily lays hold of their Affections, that I do not wonder that you made use of those Terms, to cover your Schemes, whilst you were teaching the Right to use *Force* to bring Men to Salvation. You are then to prove,

XXII. That the Magistrate can use Force to make Men obey Christ's Laws.

Your First Proposition then, *Temporal Punishments* are not proper to enforce the Laws of *Christ's Kingdom*, as you have explain'd it here,

here, *viz.* 'tis proper in the *civil Magistrate*, is absurd; 'tis a mere *Evasion* for fear you should seem to agree with the Bishop of *Bangor*; and I cannot but observe this, That rather than you will come into the Truth tho' taught by *your self*, if it agrees with his Lordship's present Notions, you are ready to propagate any Error, and willing to Defend the most palpable, as well as most pernicious ones to Society. For no Error is more pernicious than the Lawfulness of Persecution for Religion, nor more obstructive to Reformation, nor more likely to arm every Sect against all others, which must necessarily be the Consequence if the Magistrate can *enforce* the Laws of Christ's Kingdom, every time that the Magistrate happens to be of a different Persuasion from his Predecessor.

The Second Proposition of his Lordship is debated from p. 52, to 56. The Proposition is, *But Many of the Laws and Edicts of Christ's Kingdom, as to the Matter of them (for so only we can mean) are Laws of Reason, and of great Importance to Society.*

To understand what you have objected against this, we must look back to his Lordship's Account of the Laws of Christ. Sermon. p. 17. *His Laws are Declarations relating to the Favour of God in another State after this. They are Declarations of those Conditions to be perform'd in this World, on our Part, without which God will not make us Happy in that to*



come. And they are almost All general Appeals to the Will of that God; to his Nature known by the common Reason of Mankind, and to the Imitation of that Nature which must be our Perfection. Your Original Mistake here was that you make his Lordship say, The Laws of Christ are almost all Laws and Dictates of Reason and Nature, Ans. p. 17. which his Lordship never said, nor meant to say, because the Law of Christ is as different from the Law of Nature, as Two Laws, promulgated in a different manner, upon different Occasions, at very different Times, and whereof one is but Part of the other, are. However you imagining the Laws of Nature and of Christ to be One and the same, argued from its its being an Invasion of Christ's Kingdom to add Sanctions to Christ's Law, that 'twas an Invasion of Christ's Kingdom to add Sanctions to the Moral Law. Against this I objected Three Things. First against the Form of the Syllogism. 2dly. That his Lordship did not assert the Sameness of the Laws of Nature and Christ. And 3dly. That supposing almost all the Laws of Christ to be Laws of Nature, yet the Magistrate might have a Power to add Sanctions to the One, tho' not to the Other. Not that in strictness he has a Power to add Sanctions to either of them, as the Laws of Nature, or as Laws of Christ: But allowing that They agree in the Matter, yet 'tis possible he might not have the same equal Authority to add Sanctions to both. The

The *First* of these Objections against the *Form*, as you have explain'd your self, you have removed. You attempt to answer the *Second* by proving that the Laws of Christ are the Laws of Reason, the very same in all Respects, and not *as to the Matter only*, which his Lordship it seems, as 'tis agreeable to common Sense, conceiv'd to be *your* Meaning.

You begin your Proof with this *generous* Declaration, *I assure your Lordship I never did mean so*, NOR EVER WILL. P. 54. Not therefore for *your* sake, who are determin'd already, *Right or Wrong*, what you WILL mean and what not, but for our common Reader's Satisfaction, I'll consider what you have produced upon this Occasion.

*Are not the Laws of Nature and Reason*, say you, p. 55. *Laws of God? And doth not God require inward Obedience as well as Christ?—How then are the Laws of Reason the same with the Laws of Christ as to the Matter only when both require the same internal and external Obedience?*

I reply, *The Laws of Nature are Laws of God, and they require in many Cases an internal as well as external Obedience; But notwithstanding this, they are really different Laws. For First, If the Law of Nature be the very same Law with the Law of Christ, then 'twill be equally proper to say when a Turk is guilty of any immoral Act, that He properly breaks the Law of Christ. He can break only the*  
Law

Law he is *Subject* to, and not what he is *not* subject to ; more than an *Englishman* who never was in *France* can properly be said to break the Law of *France*, when he fights a Duel, because the Law of *France* forbids duelling, as well as the Law of *England*. 2dly, The Foundation of your Argument is evidently false, for thus it is that you conclude : The Laws of Nature are the Laws of God, The Laws of Christ are the Laws of God, Therefore the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of Christ are *strictly* the same, and not as to matter only. But this is just such an Inference as this is, The Laws of Nature are the Laws of God, The Laws of *Moses* were the Laws of God, Therefore the Laws of Nature and the Law of *Moses* are strictly the same. For does not God require, you say, *inward Obedience as well as Christ* ? 3dly, If the Law of Nature be strictly the same with the Law of Christ, and not as to the Matter only, then 'tis as just to say, that the *Heathen* World is properly subject to the Laws of Christ, as they are to the Law of Nature. And thus the Laws of *Zoroaster*, *Confucius*, *Christ*, and *Mahomet* are the same Law, because they all agree in the Matter of their Laws with the Moral Law.

When thus the way was clear'd p. 56. you tell us you'll venture upon another *Syllogism*, and leave it to his Lordship's Consideration. The Laws of Reason and the Moral Laws of God, are the same. But (your Lordship affirms) the  
Laws



*Laws of Christ are the same as to the Matter only with the Laws of Reason. Therefore the Laws of Christ are the same as to the Matter only with the Laws of God.* As you have thus ventured to give us a *Syllogism*, I'll venture to tell you again, 'tis a *False* one. And to shew it such I'll put it as it ought to be. The *Laws of Reason* and the *Moral Laws of God* are the same. But your Lordship affirms, that *many of the Laws of Christ* are the same as to the Matter only with the *Laws of Reason*. Therefore *many of the Laws of Christ* are the same as to the Matter only with the *moral Laws of God*. With what *Triumph* did you urge your *Syllogism*, and how readily did you wish his Lordship *here*, as once you did before, the *happier Choice* in the *something he must part with*. Put your *Syllogism* in its right *Form*, and I do not see but *Premises* and *Conclusion* too may be *held*. But 'tis (you know) but *contemning* this, and this will be answered too; or you may in your *wanted* manner say, by *Laws of God in general*, in the *Consequence*, you meant *particularly* the *Moral Laws of God*, and all will be well.

The third Objection against your *Syllogism*, you take no Notice of here. To what therefore I said before, I'll add only, That *Laws* cannot bind further than the *Legislator* designed they should. Human *Laws* therefore being made to procure the *Publick Good*, the *Laws of Nature* cannot be *strictly the same* with

with the Laws of the Magistrate, since the Laws of Nature require internal Obedience, but the Laws of the Magistrate only an external one, for the Temporal Advantages of his Subjects. You are therefore still to prove,

XXIII. That the Laws of Christ are strictly and properly the Laws of Nature, and not the same as to the *Matter* only.

His Lordship in his P. S. p. 87. asserted this, *I think I see plainly that a Person may maintain the Maxims or Motives of the World to be contrary to those Motives on which Christ's Religion was founded by himself— without maintaining either that Worldly Motives always destroy all true Religion, or that 'tis impious and wicked (as your Words are, p. 26.) in any to apply them in those Points I truly intended in my Sermon.— And I think this as plain, as it is, that I may maintain immense Riches to be in their Tendency contrary to Virtue, without supposing that they always destroy it; or that 'tis impious and wicked for a Man to leave a great Estate to his Son.*

Your Reply to this is, *1st, According to the Example set by your Friend, and approved by your Lordship. I should tell you that the Secret is now out, and that all this Bustle is with a View to leave a great Estate to your Son.— But I know better how to take than return such Usage* P. 57.

You shall readily, Sir, have me confessing too much Sarcasm in the Passage you allude to,

to. And here I shall only say to it, that since you KNOW to take such Usage better than to RETURN it, it had not been amiss to have been EXEMPLARY in it. But shall I tell you, that *You* have in a late Pamphlet treated a Person of unspotted Honesty in the most *abusive* manner that is conceivable: That *you* have endeavoured to rob him of an un sullied Reputation; that *you* have distorted the plainest Passages of his Lordship's Books, to make his Person odious to the Clergy of the Realm; that *you* have resolv'd he SHALL mean what you please to make him mean, and for this you have wrack'd his Words to make them even *absurd*, so they might but *look* the way you was determin'd to force them; that *you* have expos'd and ridiculed him, rail'd at and abus'd him; *the poor Artifice of a little Mind courting Reputation by whispering the suppos'd Faults of Others, or venting an impotent Desire of Revenge in Calumny.* Remarks. p. 15. Shall I mention, what gives too fair an Occasion even to insist upon what I said upon your *Locks and Bolts*, that *decent, very decent* Sentence, *Were such Doctrines* [as his Lordship has taught] *once to grow general among the Bishops — The Episcopal Chairs would fall the less lamented, for the sake of those who fill'd them.* p. 48. *ibid.* This and an Hundred more such Passages in a Book which *you* have been taxed with in Print, and in private by your own

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Friends,



Friends, and which you have never yet that I cou'd learn, and I assure you, I have enquired, *denied* to be your own, These I say will even justify me if I have used too severe Words to a Person who has taken such Freedoms with one of the highest Station, and best of Characters, with a View to nothing else but to render his Lordship *odious* and *unpopular*. You did well to call out on *Art, Help me A R T, all ye Powers of Logick and Learning help me.* Are these the *Gentleman's* v. Title Page, and the Dean of *Chichesters Arts* ? p. 47.

But, I proceed to the Argument. His Lordship asserts, *Worldly Motives to be contrary to those Motives upon which Christ's Religion was founded by himself.* Are they not so? Are not great Riches great Temptations to Sin? And do they not *tend* to make Men sit loose to the Things of the *next* World? Do they not too often put a wrong Byass upon Men's Minds, and warp them from their Duties? Yet notwithstanding this, it can't be proved (unless by you) that *'tis impious and wicked to have a good Estate, or to abound in this Worlds Goods.* Upon his Lordship's stating thus the Case you put the following Questions.

1. *Whether the Supremacy which is inseparable from the Imperial Crown of this Realm does not carry in it a Power of applying, and a Trust obliging to the Application of the Sanctions of humane*

humane *Laws in the Case, and on the Account of True Religion?*

This I will promise you to answer, when you'll make it intelligible upon your Scheme. For you have told us, that *'tis absurd and ridiculous in most Cases to annex Positive Rewards to good Actions* p. 28. and that *Religion is encouraged by punishing Irreligion and Profaness.* *ibid.* Does the Supremacy carry in it an *absurd and ridiculous Power* or no?

2dly, You enquire if it carries not a *Trust obliging to the Application of Sanctions on the Account of TRUE Religion.* What is it you mean by *TRUE Religion*? I beg you'll explain this Point, For under the shelter of that Word you screen yourself so often, that I perswade myself you know the Benefit of *general Terms*, how useful they are upon a pressing Difficulty, and how easy it is to stave off a Consequence by vertue of the various Applicableness of them. I repeat my Request, that you'll explain what you mean, by *True Religion*, for I suspect some secret Reserve in those Terms. However since 'tis granted on all Hands, I hope by you, that *the love of Money is the Root of all Evil.* 1 Tim. 6. 10. I will ask what I take to be your Question, in effect, *whether the Civil Magistrate has not a Trust obliging to the Application of Places and Preferments in the Case and on the Account of Good Actions?*

Your Second Question is, *Whether any one ought to be invested with a Power of doing, or may receive a Trust obliging him to do, what is contrary to the Interests of true Religion, and tends to the Destruction of it?* I will put too the parallel Question, *Whether any one ought to have a Power of doing, or may receive a Trust obliging him to dispense his Places and Preferments, since Money is the Root of all Evil, and too usually tends to the Destruction of Moral Virtues?* The Answer to *these* will answer your own Questions, and shew you the great Mistake of those who were so zealous for the Condemnation of what his Lordship preach'd purely on this Account.

P. 58—59. You have been very gracious in *disclaiming absolute Authority*, and I once more thank you for your Publick Acknowledgment of it. However as so many other's there are who have attack'd his Lordship upon that important Question, and seem to think all at stake because his Lordship has declared himself against *absolute Submission*, and has thus publicly asserted the Right of *private Judgment*, you will not take it amiss of me, if on *other Peoples* account, I transcribe some Passages from an Excellent Discourse upon *Matth. 23. 9.* preach'd by Dr. Burton, in the Reign of King Charles the Second; and publish'd by Arch-bishop Tillotson. Vol. 2d. Christ " will not have his Disciples, as the " Pharisees, to arrogate to themselves, or to " Attri-



“ Attribute to others, that which is God’s  
 “ peculiar, or is proper to himself whom God  
 “ has anointed, *viz.* to be Absolute over  
 “ Men’s Faith or Manners. He requires they  
 “ should not challenge to themselves such a  
 “ Sovereignty as admits of no Controul, such  
 “ an Authority from whom no Appeal may  
 “ be made, or which *must not* be contradict-  
 “ ed. They must not take to themselves nor  
 “ give to others, such a Power whereby they  
 “ or others shall be confined to the Opinions,  
 “ no, nor universally held to the Words of  
 “ any Men? —

“ There must be some reason why God  
 “ is κατ’ ἐξουσίαν to be called *Father*, and Christ  
 “ *Master* : and I know none other Account  
 “ can be given of this Superiority and Pre-  
 “ heminance above others, but this, that  
 “ God is absolute, Supream Lord, and Law-  
 “ giver : Therefore what he said must stand,  
 “ if an Article of Faith, our Assent is con-  
 “ cluded, if God propose it, and if a Pre-  
 “ cept of his, Obedience must be given. But  
 “ this is the Prerogative of Heaven, no mere  
 “ Man can challenge it.”

“ If this be true of all Christians that they  
 “ have a Master, a Father, then none of  
 “ them are to assume this Honour to them-  
 “ selves. They must carry themselves as *Fel-*  
 “ *low-Schollars*, as *Brethren*, that is, they must  
 “ not propose their *own Doctrines* (such as  
 “ are properly their own) which they have  
 “ not

“ not receiv’d from their *Masters* to be assent-  
 “ ed to as *infallible*: Indeed they must not  
 “ propose them at all, so as to determine  
 “ others; for in so doing they desert their  
 “ Stations, forget they are but *Schollars*. If  
 “ they will propound to others *that* which  
 “ shall determine them, it must be their *Ma-*  
 “ *sters*, not their *own*, for otherwise they  
 “ will not be so much *Præcones & Nuncii*,  
 “ as *Inventores & Autores Dogmatum*. They  
 “ that demand Men’s Assent to their Opini-  
 “ ons, and Obedience to their Commands,  
 “ which are *theirs* and not their *Masters*, do  
 “ by this make themselves *Masters*. All they  
 “ then fall under Censure who are *Creed-Coin-*  
 “ *ers*, or *Law-makers* in Christianity, who  
 “ frame Creeds, and make Laws of their own,  
 “ such as they had not from the Father of the  
 “ Christian Church.”

“ —Whence are those Diversities of *Names*  
 “ amongst us?—One is a *Pontifician*, another  
 “ a *Lutheran*, a third a *Calvinist*, a fourth an  
 “ *Arminian*: Are any of these our *Fathers*!  
 “ if they be not, why are we call’d by their  
 “ *Names*? Why should any of these divid-  
 “ ing *Names* be heard amongst us? Are we  
 “ not all the Children of one Father, the Dis-  
 “ ciples of one *Master*, the Servants of One  
 “ Lord?— But yet we cannot agree in his  
 “ Mind—. This is granted, and yet the Ex-  
 “ pedient whereby Unity may be preserv’d  
 “ is not hard if we come with peaceable  
 “ Minds

“ Minds, if we indeed desire it. Therefore  
 “ if in this Case, if we can but suppose  
 “ ourselves *fallible* in *interpreting* and grant  
 “ our Brethren a *liberty of judging*; if we  
 “ can think the Words capable of the Sense  
 “ they give, or can but believe that *they*  
 “ *think* them so; if the Sense they put up-  
 “ on them be not in it self opposite to and  
 “ inconsistent with—a Good Life.—Or if it  
 “ be not so in Them, if notwithstanding  
 “ this Difference—they agree with us in  
 “ what is plain—I see no reason to disown  
 “ them as no Christians, and whilst we own  
 “ them as Christians we must love them as  
 “ Brethren.”

“ But if this be true that we have no  
 “ Father on Earth, how is it that we hear  
 “ so much of an infallible Judge? Either  
 “ an Old Man sitting in a Chair at *Rome*?  
 “ Or else a *Synod of Doctors*, for the most  
 “ part packed together by a Faction, and  
 “ designed to drive on some secular Interest?  
 “ — But what mean these Pretenders that  
 “ they thus take upon them? Will they de-  
 “ cide all our Controversies, end our Debates?  
 “ An excellent Attempt! But will they do  
 “ it indeed? Yes effectually; and if any  
 “ doubt of their Decrees, they shall be quick-  
 “ ly convinced by a light burning Fire. They  
 “ will take Care to keep those that are under  
 “ them in Ignorance, they shall not have  
 “ Knowledge enough to question their De-  
 “ termina-



" terminations. Or if any Light do break  
 " through all the Curtains they have drawn,  
 " then they afright them with *Anathema's*,  
 " and if these will not do neither, they shall  
 " to the Stake. How grievously the Christian  
 " World hath been abu'd by these Practices  
 " hath been notorious, whilst these false  
 " Teachers do not at all serve the Designs of  
 " Truth and Piety but merely of their own  
 " Ambition and Covetousness. — I wou'd not  
 " be understood to detract from a duly con-  
 " gregated Synod of wise and learned Men  
 " their just Authority, which yet I must think  
 " doth not amount to that of a Father or  
 " *Rabbi*, as here explain'd."

" If any Man demand my Assent to his  
 " Doctrine, I may and must ask for his Au-  
 " thority, and if he have no more than this  
 " *ipse dixit*, I must tell him, he is not my  
 " Master, nor any Man on Earth but One  
 " even Christ. Let us then *scorn* to live in  
 " slavery to any Mans Opinions, but stand  
 " fast in the Liberty wherewith Christ has  
 " made us free. If we fail to do this we are  
 " wanting to ourselves, and our Master too,  
 " we loose our Liberty, we are in manifest  
 " danger of erring, we give from him the  
 " Honour that is due to him, he will be jea-  
 " lous of this Piece as well, as any other.  
 " Indeed it is a great as any ; it is the Hon-  
 " our of his Wisdom and Goodness. Who-  
 " soever fully acquiesces in any Man's Autho-

" rity,

“ rity, and upon his single Testimony super-  
 “ cedes further Reasoning, he ascribes to  
 “ him *Infallibility*, and makes him a God.”

Such Christian Principles, such generous noble Thoughts cannot, I am perswaded, but be acceptable to every one, who has at Heart the Advancement of Christian *Knowledge*, and Christian *Peace*; and who detests and abhors the Spirit of Persecution, in what shape or under what Mask soever, it appears. But I return to your *Considerations*, which I have left perhaps too long.

I will not meddle with what you have replied to his Lordship's Charge, viz. *that he found himself ridicul'd for supposing that the Committee meant to support their Charge by what they quoted out of his Sermon.* You must own the Charge, and the Ridicule too, in these same Words of yours: *The Committee fix their Charge on the former viz. Doctrines, his Lordship will Answer to the latter, And no doubt the World about us will improve by the Controversy.* All that is comprehended under this Word **L A T T E R**, is quoted from the Sermon, and *not to support* their Charge; which is what his Lordship has said from these Words.

From pag. 61. to 67. I find no great Matter but what is purely Personal in relation to his Lordship. You return again p. 67. to the Complaint against My *Candor* in *representing you as having no Concern but for the Goods*

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of

of the Church. Allowing Sir, your Charge, cou'd you find no better way of Retaliation, than to bring into our *Personal Debates*, the *Sacred Scriptures*, in a Manner more becoming the *Free-Thinkers* of the Age than a *Clergyman*, and a *Dignitary* of the Church; or immediately to apply this to the Word of God, and take the Liberty with Christ, that you wou'd with your Fellow Creatures? If the One was want of *Candor*, I assure you, the Other is something much worse, especially considering that your Reasoning upon that Parable of our Saviour, tho' you give it what turn you please, will not hold parallel to what you have produced it for, as is easy, were it necessary to be shewn. In the next Page as Dr. Snape had complemented you for the Services you had done him, you resolv'd to stand by him, at all Hazards. Dr. Snape had said in his *First Letter*, *That the Desirable Work of the Reformation was not compleated till the Earthly Rulers, being themselves converted established and confirmed it by Temporal Sanctions*. The Bishop replied, *A Sentence, Sir, which if it be duly considered must be very shocking to every Christian Mind, unless the desirable Thing in Christ's Kingdom be Riches and Power. All who have not forgot the very Name of Jesus Christ and all his Words relating to this Subject must know what to think of it*. You, Mr. Dean, here cry out of *Tragedies*, and declare 'tis impossible that Dr. Snape should mean what he is charged with.



with. But why? Because *in Fact the Reformation*, say you, *carried off both Riches and Power from the Church.* And what then? Did it *leave none*?

The Assertion of Dr. Snape is, *The Desirable Work of the Reformation was not compleat, till the Earthly Rulers established and confirm'd it by Temporal Sanctions.* That is, according to your Scheme, till *absurdly and ridiculously* positive Rewards were annexed to it, and Irreligion and Profaneness were by Act of Parliament punished. But you have another Account of this Affair from the Preamble to the Act of Uniformity, which is, to make a Confirmation by Temporal Sanctions to be the same with *comforting and discomfoting the Professors of Truth*, and *reviving the due Honour of God.* Upon this, I beg leave to ask, What were the Temporal Sanctions, which being *added*, made the Reformation *compleat*, since the Reformation was not compleat without them? 2dly, Was the Reformation *compleat* when it had those Sanctions which were added *primo Elizabethæ*? 3dly, Was the Revival of the due Honour of God, and the Comfort of the Professors of the Truth of Christ's Religion, the Sanctions of the Law, *primo Elizabethæ*? if not, then the *Comforting the Professors of Truth* was not the Meaning of Dr. Snape by his *Temporal Sanctions.* In short, to establish and confirm the Reformation by *Temporal Sanctions*, is by Law to annex Positive Rewards and Punish-

ments to it. To say then that the Reformation was not *complete* till the civil Magistrate annex'd his Rewards to it, is just as if one should assert Christianity was not *complete* till *Constantine's* Days ; or that the Kingdom of Christ was not *established complete*, till earthly Princes put their helping Hand to it. What real Benefit true Christianity has thence received, let the Reader judge from the Historians since *Constantine's* Time.

But the most refined Piece of Divinity is still behind. His Lordship told Dr. *Snape*, that his Assertion was *worthy of him who contends professedly for making Religion a Civil Test, for debasing the most sacred Thing in the World into a Political Tool, and an Engine of State.* Your Answer to this is so surprising, and so *worthy* of a Clergyman, p. 71—72, that I can't but examine it particularly. *Is not Religion the Test, say you, in every Case, where an Oath is required?— There is not a Cause be it never so trivial, tried in Westminster-Hall, but Religion is made a Civil Test; and is it right to require this Test of a Man's Honesty, before he is admitted an Evidence in a Five Shilling Cause; and is it impious to require IT, when he is admitted to a Place of Government, and has, in part, the Lives and Fortunes of the Nation committed to his Fidelity? Is it reasonable to require THIS Test of a Witness — and is it absurd to require some Security when*  
the

*the Preservation of the Establish'd Church is the Point in Question.*

To this I reply, First, An Appeal to God as Judge and Avenger of what we say or do, is absolutely necessary on many Accounts: Do you therefore infer, 'tis a *Censure upon the common Sense and Reason of Mankind, upon all Times and all Nations of the World* to blame those who would make the *Sacrament* a Civil Test? An Oath has a direct Tendency to the End to which 'tis applied; and consequently is fit and proper to make Men speak and act the Truth. The *Sacrament* has not any Tendency to that for which 'tis here applied more than any other Action whatever has. 2dly. The End of the *Sacrament* is, if we can be contented with what the Word of God has taught us, to *remember* the Death of Christ, and to testify our Christian *Charity* to one another. Of what then can this be a *Test*, unless of this, that we remember Christ's Sufferings for our Salvation, and that we are in Charity with all Men? But by this new Divinity we are to *remember* (and 'tis very well worth while) that we are made *Justices* or *Captains*, or have Civil Employments, or Preferments bestowed upon us. What is this but perverting the most sacred Part, and most solemn Duty of Christianity to make it a Tool to Politicians, a Scorn and Reproach to Libertines and Atheists, and a Grief and Concern to Good and Religious Men.

3dly. A



3dly. A Man is appointed Justice of Peace, or made a Commissioner of Trade, or has any other Preferment, or Trust which he's to perform. What is he then to do? Why he must *qualify* himself, *i. e.* publicly eat of that Bread, and drink of that Wine in Remembrance that Christ died for him. But what Relation has this to a Commissioner's Place to prove him more Honest, more Able, or more fit and proper for his Post? This Action would prove him indeed a *Christian*, if that is required, or 'tis a Test that he owns himself in *Christian Charity* with all Men. But what particular *Security* doth it give of his *Fidelity* to the Government?

A Test then in its Nature ought to have a Tendency to the End it is designed for, you say, therefore the *Preservation of the Established Church being the Point in Question*, The Sacrament is a fit and proper Test for that. But is not the most solemn Part of our Religion prostituted by that human Addition? Whilst 'tis originally instituted for only the two Ends before-mentioned, it has now a Third annex'd to it by Civil Sanctions, and all Persons by that Act profess that they *remember* Christ's Death, are in *Charity* with all Men, and are of the Church of *England*. If Men can plead for thus abusing the express Ordinances of our Saviour, 'tis time to urge

to

to the *Law* and to the *Testimony*. A Test to secure the Church no doubt is right, but then it ought to be such a one as is not at the Expence of Religion: And no doubt such a one may with Ease be found out, which shall not tend to make Men *Hypocrites*, nor prejudice Religion, and yet may secure what 'tis designed to secure. But all this is foreign to the present Controversy, and therefore I leave it and proceed to what more immediately concerns my self.

You say, p. 65. *If his Lordship will make it (my 2d Lett.) his own, by declaring that he will justify and stand to the Doctrines and Consequences of it, if he will put a little of his Reputation upon this Issue, though you had as live teach Children to read as answer that Letter, you may be tempted to submit even to this Employment.* A worthy Request, Mr. Dean! I assure you, I am very willing to answer for my own Infirmities, and do not desire to involve his Lordship on my Account. But if I may venture to guess from what you *have* objected to what you *can* object, I hope I am able myself to satisfy your Demands; and I promise you the satisfaction of waiting upon you, and of owning my Mistakes whenever you shall please to detect them.

Your First Charge is, p. 73. *See how he defends that Passage in your Sermon — If any Man*  
upon

upon Earth have a Right to add to the Sanctions of his Laws, &c. they are so far Kings in his stead, &c.

Pray, Sir, What was it I propos'd to do? Was it not to vindicate it from Dr. Snape's Comment which his Lordship very justly call'd *hard and unjust*? This I propos'd to do, and this I did, and you own that I did it, and yet it seems my Endeavours were to clear his Lordship from *no body knows what*. Tell us if you please what was Doctor Snape's Comment upon those Words. Was it not, *They dethrone Christ from his Spiritual Kingdom*? Accordingly Dr. Snape tells the World in his 2d. Lett. that the *Worthy Dean of Chichester has clearly and incontestably proved for him*, that his Lordship's Expressions do import no less than *dethroning Christ*. Nay don't you your self say in this very place, *it has been insisted on that your Words amount to saying, that all who add Sanctions do usurp the Dominion of Christ and DETHRONE him*? Now I did prove that his Lordship's Words did not imply DETHRONING; and consequently they who first charg'd That upon his Words and they who insisted upon it, were Both UNJUST in that comment.

Upon this you go on, *He allows then, my Lord, that you do affirm that Christ is so far (tho' not totally) divested of Power.— If you allow this Defence, then we say, To divest Christ of any of his Power is impious.* But, Sir, where



where do I affirm this, or *allow* this? Or where doth his Lordship *allow* this, *that the Magistrate in adding Sanctions to Christ's Laws does so far divest him*, which you charge upon his Lordship, p. 74. His Lordship's Words are, *They are so far King's in his stead, and reign in their own Kingdom, and not in His.* My Words are, *If they Dethrone Christ, then Christ is totally exempted from all Power.* But his Lordship's Proposition directly asserts some Power still to Christ, tho' join'd with that of other Men; therefore it must be hard and unjust to comment upon his Lordship's words so as to make them mean a total Exemption from all Power. Neither of these Propositions *allow* or *affirm* that Christ is so far divested of Power, But only say, That so far they add their own Kingdoms to the Kingdom of Christ, and reign in their own Kingdoms, and not in His, as Men add Sanctions in Matters of Conscience and Salvation. This is affirm'd, and since you deny it, you are to prove

XXIV. That when Men add Sanctions to Matters of Conscience and Salvation, They do NOT add their own Kingdoms to the Kingdom of Christ, and reign in their own Kingdom, and not in His.

*Again, your Friend labours much about Laws of Reason and Christ, upon which Subject he is always unhappy, and he puts the Question to himself, p. 32. In Cases where 'tis visible that Men break the Laws of Christ, can the Magi-*

strate interpose? If it affects not the State, he is of Opinion that He cannot. But now for the reason: Why truly the Magistrate must not judge in visible Cases, because he cannot judge in invisible ones: How happy are you my Lord in a Second! p. 74—75.

How unhappy are you, Mr. Dean, always to mistake! My Reason was, *What Sanctions can any Man have a Right to add to make a Christian love his Neighbour, who can never know whether a Man complies or not, viz. on account of the Sanctions.* Suppose the Magistrate were to exert his imaginary Power, and to punish a Man that did not love his Neighbour: The Punishment might keep the Hatred from breaking out into open Acts, but it would not make the Man comply with the Design of the Magistrate and make him love his Enemy. 'Tis to no purpose to interpose, because the Magistrate can never know what Influence his Sanctions have.

The nigher you draw towards the Conclusion, the more witty you grow. *The Authority of the Magistrate, you tell us, to enforce Obedience to the plain Laws of Religion, was the main Point your Friend was to speak to. I had—asserted the Magistrate's Right to add the Sanctions of this World—since the Magistrate being the Vicegerent of God, it is his Duty to maintain the Honour of God and Religion. This was so plainly stated, that your Friend could not avoid seeing it, tho' he had*  
nothing

*nothing to say to it. See, my Lord, how he deserts the Cause, p. 5. when you'll explain what you mean by Vicegerent in this Case I'll consider your Assertion. Thus, my Lord, he twice walk'd up to the Point, and for no Reason that I can see, but to shew his Baseness, and twice to run away from it.*

'Tis the Magistrate's Duty, you tell us, to make Men do what the Light of their own Minds teach them. Why? Because he is *God's Vicegerent*. Will you stand by this Reason, Mr. Dean, and allow this as the Foundation of the Magistrate's Power? 'Tis his Duty to make Men do *what the Light of their own Minds teaches them*. 'Tis his Duty then to allow an *Universal Toleration*: 'Tis his Duty not only to permit, but to *make* every honest Man worship God in the manner that the *Light of his own Mind teaches him* to be best. No Man ought to be prosecuted for his Opinions, upon your own Notion, neither in Convocation nor out of it. Remember, Sir, your Concession, which I'll promise you not to *desert*, and if you do, you shall not fail to hear of it, whether you'll explain the Term *Vicegerent* or not. The Case is not stated here upon the Foot of *Truth* or *Falshood*, but upon *what the Light of their own Minds teach Men* to do: Not as you stated it in your *Answer*, p. 7. whether it was *plain and indisputable*, or whether 'twas matter of *Controversy*: But you put it here upon the Foot of *Sincerity*, upon



*what the Light of their own Minds teach Men to do.*

How angry soever you are at my asking you the meaning of *Vicegerent*, and tho' you declare that you *don't intend to instruct me*; yet out of your singular Humanity you tell me 'tis the same with  $\Delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma$  θεῶν in the 13th to the *Romans*. But is the Greek word  $\Delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma$  the same with the English one *Vicegerent*? How pleasant wou'd it sound, to translate it so, as often as it occurs in the N. Testament? *He that is greatest amongst you*, says our Saviour, Matt. 23. 11. *Let him be your*  $\Delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma$ , *your Servant*. No, let him be your *Vicegerent*, says Mr. Dean of *Chichester*. So too in the Abstract, 1 Cor. 12. 5. *There are differences of Administrations, or Offices*, says our Version, but it seems it should be *Vicegerencies* according to your Translation. I still therefore desire you to explain the Word *Vicegerent*, and to let us know whether *Caligula* was such, when according to you, he made his Horse *Consul*. I the rather do this, because you have commented upon the Greek Words in such a manner as either to beg the Question in debate, or else say nothing to the purpose. The Reason you assign why the Magistrate's *Duty* is to maintain Religion by Temporal Sanctions, is *because he is God's Vicegerent*. What now is the Meaning of *Vicegerent*? Why 'tis One who has a Power to reward them that do well, and to execute wrath on Evil Doers. If you apply this Account

count to the Matter in hand, you beg the Question: If not, I must return you your own words, *I wonder you thought it necessary to write, before you had any thing to say to the Purpose.*

Your next Paragraph displays your profound skill in the *Roman Antiquities*. *Caligula* made his Horse a *Priest*, You, Sir, have accomplish'd what that Emperor only design'd, but died too soon to bring it to pass: viz. You have made his Horse a *Consul*. And here you have let us into another Peice of *Secret History*, that the Roman *Consul in the Humility of his Heart CHOSE the Slave the Companion of his Triumphs*. The Verse in *Juvenal*, 'tis certain implies no such CHOICE, nor hitherto have I been able to find any Grounds for such an Opinion. But as long as it wou'd show *Contempt* of your Adversary, 'twas no matter whether 'twas true or false. However I'll add One Point more for you to prove,

Lastly, That the *Roman Consul CHOSE the Slave the Companion of his Triumphs*.

And now, Sir, I have gone thro' this Letter of yours, I will not presume to guess whether you are *willing to attend upon every Call of this Nature*. You promis'd the World in your *Answer*, p. 50—51, that you would *never trouble it again* upon so trivial a Matter, as you was then engaged in. You have, as you tell me I have, *a Natural Right to be like your self, and to write like your self*. *Confid.* p. 60.  
However,

However, I assure you, 'Tis not your *Contempt*, nor all your Arts in puzzling of this Controversy, nor all your Wit and Humour in Writing, that shall hinder me from endeavouring to take off *your Beauty-Washes*, to strip you of your fine Words, and to make you appear in a true Light. I have shewn that you have *unsaid again*, or *explain'd away* in one Part of that Sermon what you *said* in another. And whilst I am able to know that Both sides of a Contradictory Proposition are not true, so long shall I be sure that you cannot defend *both*; and till you retract One or Other of them, as oft as you give me Opportunity, I will promise to be at your Service. I am

Reverend Sir,

Novemb. 8th.

Your, &c.

1717.

A. A. SYKES.

APPENDIX.



## APPENDIX.

THAT the Reader may be satisfied how consistent a Writer Mr. Dean of *Chichester* is, and how ready to defend himself on all Attacks, entrench'd in *both* sides of this Question, I shall beg leave to represent what He has taught in his 5th of Nov. *Sermon*, and compare it with what is *at present* the Doctrine in his *Considerations*. 'Tis the Right of every One who searches after Truth, to examine into his Notions, and to *change* them if they appear to be false. This is so far from being matter of *Reproach*, or from being the just Occasion of *Censure*, or Ill Will; that 'tis in reality an Argument of the highest Virtue; 'Tis a Proof of *Honesty* and *Sincerity*, Virtues most amiable in the sight of God and Man. But where no *Change* of Principles appears, But Things are gloss'd over, and *defended* in Ones own Book, and at the same *Opposed* with mighty Zeal, and even Prosecutions in *Another* Man's, it shews something more like to *present Views*, or *Party Zeal*, or *Personal Pique* than to real Change of Mind. In the Sermon p. 10. We meet with this, "*The Civil Magistrate*  
 "*has a Temporal Power; and the Peace and*  
 "*Order of this World are his Care and Con-*  
 "cern

“ cern: *’Tis his PROPER Business to con-*  
 “ *sider the Actions of Men with regard to Pub-*  
 “ *lick Peace and Order, without respecting*  
 “ *from what INTERNAL Principle they*  
 “ *flow. If the Actions of Men are such, as*  
 “ *tend to disturb the Peace, or to destroy the*  
 “ *Frame of the Government over which he pre-*  
 “ *sides, whether they proceed from Conscience*  
 “ *or not, he’s not bound to consider, nor indeed*  
 “ *CAN He, but ’tis his Duty to punish*  
 “ *and to restrain them. Again, p. 11. As*  
 “ *to mere Difference in Opinion, which ends*  
 “ *only in Speculation, or influences only the*  
 “ *INTERNAL Acts of the Mind, or pro-*  
 “ *duces only such EXTERNAL Acts as no*  
 “ *way concern the Publick Peace, I see not how*  
 “ *the Magistrate can interest himself in them*”.  
 Is it easy now to conceive that Mr. Dean  
 should interpret his Lordship’s Expression,  
 viz. *Outward Acts*, as he has, and yet to  
 have us’d the very same in his own Sermon?  
 “ *’Tis the Magistrate’s proper Business to con-*  
 “ *sider the Actions of Men with regard to pub-*  
 “ *lick Peace without respecting from what IN-*  
 “ *TERNAL Principle they flow*”. If we  
 look into the *Considerations*, we are here  
 taught thus, p. 23, &c. “ *In Maleficiis Vo-*  
 “ *luntatem spectari non Exitum* is a Maxim of  
 “ the Roman Law, and I believe, of every  
 “ Civil Law in the World; and if this *Vo-*  
 “ *luntas* (Intention) be the chief thing re-  
 “ garded by the Law in such Cases, how comes  
 “ your

“ your Lordship to teach, that *Outward Ac-*  
 “ *tions without regard to the Intention*, are  
 “ the *only Object* of the Magistrate’s Care.—  
 “ And P. 38. A Law *regarding Outward Ac-*  
 “ *tions only* is no Rule of Justice or Rea-  
 “ son; and therefore cannot be a proper  
 “ Direction for a Moral Agent, nor a proper  
 “ Law for Man. But as your Lordship has  
 “ stated the Case, the Civil Law commands  
 “ only *Outward Actions*, not REGARD-  
 “ ING INWARD MOTIVES ;  
 “ the Magistrate judges of such only; and  
 “ since no Man is bound by the Law to  
 “ more than the Law and the Lawgiver  
 “ requires, the Subject is likewise bound to  
 “ *outward Actions only*, and consequently,  
 “ neither Law, nor Magistrate in command-  
 “ ing, nor Subject in obeying, have any  
 “ Views or Ties to Morality ?” These  
 dreadful Consequences attend his Lordship’s  
 Doctrine, for teaching that *Outward Acts a-*  
*lone are the Objects of the Magistrate’s*  
*Care*. But when the Dean of *Chichester* teach-  
 es that the *Magistrate is to take Care of*  
*Outward Acts*, without respecting *from what*  
*internal Principles they flow*, ’tis good and  
 true; then the *Intention* is regarded, then  
 the *Magistrate and his Laws have all the Mo-*  
*ral Rectitude* they need to have, and all is  
 safe.

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But



But, 2ly, In the Sermon we are told p. 11. *Wherever Difference of Opinion is attended with Consequences that may affect the State, How can it stand with Reason, or PUBLICK GOOD, to exclude the Magistrate's Power in such Cases?* Again, *Penal Laws have for their End, as all other Civil Laws have, the GOOD of the STATE, ibid.* Again, p. 13—14, *The Magistrate has nothing to do with Conscience; and therefore on one Hand he has no Right to bring Conscience to his Bar, to punish the Errors or Mistakes of it, or to censure even the Actions which proceed from it, unless they affect that which is his immediate Care, the PUBLICK GOOD, or the private Peace and Property of his Subjects.* In these Passages the Publick Good is made the End of all Civil Laws, the Measure of the Magistrate's Power, and his immediate Care. His Lordship having spoke just in the same manner, this Doctrine is grown *Machiavel's Politicks*: and every that thing is Fatal to Government. Now we are told, *your Lordship builds upon a Notion too common amongst some Modern Writers, That 'tis the Magistrate's Office to take Care of the Publick Good only.* Conf. p. 40. And again, p. 45. *But what is this PUBLICK GOOD? Is the Magistrate subject to the Rules of Reason and Morality in making Laws for PUBLICK GOOD, or is he not? — If he is, then 'tis plain that the Rules of Reason and Morality—are superior to the Considerations*

tions of Publick Good,— and consequently the Laws for promoting Publick Good,— must take in more than mere external Actions. Again, p. 44. But let PUBLICK GOOD, or any Thing else that your Lordship shall like better, be the Object of the Magistrate's Care.— Your Lordship cannot allow the Magistrate to enquire whether the Subject intended the PUBLICK GOOD, or any thing else, by his Material, (you should have said Outward) Action, &c. How is the Publick Good discarded here, because the Bishop of Bangor has made That his Principle? But,

Thirdly, The Sermon teaches us, p. 15. Where Men build upon Religion Doctrines or Principles destructive of Civil Government, they must answer to God for perverting Religion, and to the Magistrate for disturbing the Publick. Again, p. 14. No one else can bring Conscience before him, or by the Pleas of it supersede his (the Magistrate's) Authority in any Case proper for his Cognizance. For the Magistrate might well say, The Action is such as I am concern'd to look into, Conscience I have nothing to do with, it doth not lye before me, and therefore I shall not attend to its Pretences. To keep up this just Distinction, and to inculcate it as clear as possible, He tells us, p. 13. When the Magistrate calls a Man to an Account for his Actions, I cannot see that it is so much as his Duty to enquire, whether the Man took what he did to be a Part of his Religion,

or whether he followed the Dictates of his Conscience or not; what can the Civil Magistrate have to do in such Questions; or how can he arrive at any Evidence concerning the Truth of these Matters? The Nature of the Action lies properly before him, consider'd in it self, and in its Consequences, and if it tend to Mischief, he has a Right to punish it, without considering whether it be a religious Act or not. When the B. of Bangor had said much the same thing, with this, viz. That the Magistrate was not a Judge of internal Principles, and that Men were to answer to God for them, and to the Magistrate for such Acts as affected the State, What Clamours and Outcries are rais'd? Then 'tis made a Question, Why the Magistrate only must be necessarily blind, and obliged to have less Understanding than any of his Subjects. Cons. p. 28. That should he confine his Judgment to External Actions only, he would dwindle into a mere State-Mountebank, and his Laws would be mere Beauty-Wishes, intended only to make People look well, whether they are in Health or no. Then the Crime is aggravated, p. 26. I hope your Lordship will not say, that as often as a Man is accused of Murder, so often the Magistrate invades the Prerogative of God, and sets up to be a Discerner of Hearts. This is a very plain Case, my Lord, and to be determined by Sense and Experience: And let the World judge, whether there is such a Thing as knowing the Difference between an honest, well-meaning



ing Man and a Criminal. And I only desire that every Man, who thinks himself a Judge in this Case, would allow the Magistrate to have as much Understanding as himself, and to be as capable of judging as he is". Now the Magistrate has a Right to look *beyond* Outward Actions as they affect Society, and he is to judge of the Man's Disposition, and the Motives upon which he acted, p. 22. But further still :

We are told in the Sermon, p. 15. One may be mistaken in his Notions of Religion, and yet in his Political Capacity, as touching the Laws of his Country he may be blameless, and as long as he continues so, his Mistakes are out of the Magistrate's Power. Now if this Doctrine be true, as no doubt it is, whence is it that we have a contrary Doctrine taught in the *Considerations*? There the Civil Law is made to require a *real* and *moral* Goodness in every Action ; and 'tis said, *That the Aptness of an Action to serve the Publick Good, gives it not a due Perfection with respect to the Magistrate.* p. 39. which if it be true, and that *real* and *moral* Goodness is required by Civil Laws, then 'tis impossible to be *blameless in a Political Capacity*, if one's Actions proceed not from a *perfect pure Heart*, since in That only is *real and moral Goodness*.

By this Time I doubt not that the Reader perceives what a *double* Part is here acted by our Reverend Dean. A Man may hold an Opinion, and may be mistaken : But to hold

*two contradictory Ones, is in Reality to hold none. Should he therefore insist upon the Justification of his Sermon, and at the same time of his Considerations, he will find (they are Mr. Dean's own Words, Anf. p. 53) that he has a Matter of another Nature upon his Hands, than ever he was engaged in.*

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## A SECOND

## APPENDIX,

*In Vindication of a Passage in the former Letter against Dr. Snape.*

IN an Appendix to my former Letter, I thought I had Reason to vindicate my self and several Others, from a very *unjust* and very *hard* Reflexion cast by the Reverend Dr. *Snape* upon all that stood up in Defence of the Bishop of *Bangor*, as being *Enemies to all Revelation*. I thought this so cruel a Charge, that I could not but call upon him publicly to prove it or retract it. But still it stands untouch'd, and I suppose, 'tis design'd that it shall stand so, since the Doctor has thought fit to Reply to the  
*Other*



Other Part of that Appendix, without the least Notice of *this*. My Lord Bishop had Occasion to call upon Dr. *Snape*, for the Proof of a most shocking Insinuation : The Doctor's Answer is, 'Twas *but a Problem, or Query only, and not incumbent on him to prove it*, Pref. *Vindication*, p. 6. If this Conduct will not justify the most vile Insinuations that ever were invented by the most malicious Heart, or uttered by the most malicious Tongue, let the World judge. By making a Query of it, how easy is it to spread abroad all the Slander, Calumny and Lies that a wicked Man can contrive ; and what Satisfaction is it to an injur'd Reputation, that 'tis truly but a Query and not an Assertion. But what I call'd upon the Doctor to prove, is, *not a Problem or Query only*, but a positive Assertion. I still therefore insist upon the Proof of this, and still must think, that till he does prove it, or retract it, no Man ought to give any Credit to what the Doctor relates in Point of Fact.

The other Point in my Appendix the Doctor has examined in his *Vindication*, p. 60. In a second Letter to the Bishop of *Bangor*, Dr. *Snape* had this Assertion, *Must* (a Man during the Examination of his Religion) *live like an Heathen out of the Communion of the Church*? No certainly, *but submit himself, for the Authority's sake, to the yet unexamined Decisions of the Church*, p. 56, 57. Upon this I ask'd  
*What Decisions of Doctrines are there to be*

*professed in Order to Communion, which Men are to receive implicitly, and implicitly to profess they believe? What are these unexamined Decisions of the Church. that are blindly to be submitted to, in Order not to live like a Heathen.*

To this the Doctor has replied, First, *If I had put in his Y E T, the Sophistry had been too apparent.* 2dly, *This Question requires a distinct Answer for every distinct Member of the Church.* 3dly, *Mr Sykes quite forgets that all baptized Persons do not come to be confirmed, nor all who do, so well instructed as they should be, nor those who are best instructed secure from After-doubts about the Doctrines wherein they had been instructed.*

To this I answer, First, That there can be no Sophistry in the Expression, because there is in this Case no Difference betwixt, *Yet unexamined Doctrines*, and *unexamined Doctrines*. For if they are *unexamined*, they must be *Yet unexamined*. 2dly, The Question only relates to what Doctrines are to be submitted to *in Order to Communion*. The Doctor says, a Man must submit to some *yet unexamined ones* in Order to That. I asked which they were. 'Tis no Answer to say, that *all do not stick at the same Difficulties*, or equally improve themselves in Spiritual Knowledge. For all are or ought to be *instruEd* so far in the *grounds* of their Religion, as to know Them *before* they communicate. All the Decisions of a Church are

not *Terms of Communion*: And consequently in order to Communion, a Man need not submit to *all* its Decisions. 3dly, The Doctor's Notion is plainly, that a Man in order to Communion must *submit to every Doctrine* that the Church has *decided*. How is it else that he talks here of *a distinct Answer for every distinct Member of the Church*, according to their *spiritual Improvements*? This Notion in other Words is, Every ignorant Communicant, and every one that is most learned must profess their Belief in order to Communion, in all the same Doctrines, tho' the ignorant Man knows nothing of the Matter, nor ever heard of any such Notion. What is this but to believe as the Church believes, and upon the Foundation of other Peoples Knowledge to communicate? 4thly, *Tho' all do not come to be confirmed, nor are all so well instructed as they ought to be*, yet to argue from thence for submission to *yet unexamined Decisions*, is to argue from plain Abuses, to greater Abuses still. 'Tis an Abuse to receive to Communion any Man without his being *instructed* in what is necessary. And therefore our Church has enjoined that *none be admitted to the Holy Communion, until such time as he be confirmed or desirous to be confirmed*. Nor is he to be confirmed till he is *instructed* in what is necessary to Communion, and consequently the Church requires



quires no such thing as blind Submission to *yet unexamined Decisions*. 5thly, 'Tis not necessary that a Man should *settle his personal Perswasion as to every Point of Doctrine required in that Communion*, to which he joins. He needs no more *in Order to Communion* than what he has been *instructed* in. And all Churches, even that of *Rome* in the midst of all her Tyranny, and notwithstanding the many human Inventions and human Doctrines taught in all Ages as Essentials of Christianity, yet they have used but one Baptismal Creed, *viz.* the Apostles. This an adult Person must be able to *repeat* before he can be baptized: He is not to submit to it as *yet unexamined*, nor wou'd he be baptized upon such Terms. If his personal Perswasion then be settled thus far, I ask if the Church requires any *other Doctrines* (I do not speak of Practices or the *Agenda* of Religion, but the *Credenda* alone) to be submitted to by him? 6thly, I need not observe that the ancient Church was wont to confirm the Person baptized as soon as ever he was baptized. From whence 'tis evident that no *more* Doctrines were taught him in Order to Confirmation, than he was already *instructed* in.

I had said, *When a Person of riper Years is baptized— what is he baptized into? Are any other Doctrines of the Church required of him to believe or to submit to, or are they so much as mentioned, besides what are contained in the Apostle's Creed?* Dr. Snape replies, *that the Catechism is required to be N. B. learned of every Person before he is brought to be Confirmed.— In that there are Doctrines and Decisions of the Church distinct from the Apostle's Creed, relating to the Two Sacraments.*

I reply First, this Catechism is to be *learned*. And consequently not to be submitted to *unexamined*, which is what I contend for. 2dly, I was not speaking of the *Agenda* of Religion, which evidently contain the *Two Sacraments*, but of the *Credenda* alone. 3dly, When I said *no other Doctrines are so much as mentioned*, I was speaking of the Baptism of adult Persons. Nor is it required that I remember that such should be instructed in the Catechism in order to Baptism. 4thly, The Dr. should have proved that they are to submit to *yet unexamined Decisions* of the Church, and he has only produced Instances of Decisions which are all *examined* in Order to Communion.

In short, by *Doctrines* I plainly meant Points of mere Belief, and I asserted the  
 Creed

( III )

Creed to contain all such as are necessary to be believ'd or *submitted* to in Order to Communion; But whether I was right or wrong in that Assertion, it makes nothing against the thing I undertook to prove, *viz.* That *no Man is obliged to submit for the Authorities sake to the yet unexamin'd Decisions of the Church.*

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F I N I S.

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